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The Betrayal of the Red, White & Blue:
The Failures of Institutional Self-Regulation
& The Military’s #MeToo Movement
KRISTEN M. STONE †
We have relied on the chain of command to deal with this issue, and
the chain of command has failed for decades. America gives us their
sons and daughters, and we’ve failed to discharge the responsibility
to take care of them.
— Major General Dennis Laich
United States Army (Retired) 1

INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 2020, Specialist Vanessa Guillén
disappeared. 2 The next day, Vanessa’s captain reported her
†J.D. 2022, University at Buffalo School of Law. I would like to thank Patrick

Callahan and Austin Mann for their thoughtful suggestions, careful edits, and
unwavering friendship. I also would like to thank Professor Christine P.
Bartholomew for her invaluable guidance and ceaseless support, patience, and
mentorship. Lastly, I would like to thank my family. Mom, those constant battles
to get me to read as a kid were the beginning of what became a love of language
and the beautiful stories it can tell. I owe you more than words can say. Tom,
thank you for always being in my corner and believing in me, at times, more than
I believed in myself—I couldn’t have done it without you.
1. Liz Halloran, Stunned by Military Sex Scandals, Advocates Demand
Changes (May 26, 2013), https://will.illinois.edu/news/story/stunned-by-militarysex-scandals-advocates-demand-changes.
2. Johnny Diaz et al., What to Know About the Death of Vanessa Guillen,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/vanessa-guillenfort-hood.html. Vanessa Guillén was posthumously advanced from Private First
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missing to the United States Army Criminal Investigation
Command, and a search ensued. 3 Weeks passed with no
news from the military—not even to the family who
desperately sought any inkling of information. 4 The family
was not only worried because Vanessa had disappeared, but
also because weeks prior she had disclosed that she did not
feel safe on the base. Vanessa was being sexually harassed
by her superior officer. 5
Vanessa confided in a small group of individuals
including her mother, other family members and friends, and
even a few fellow soldiers. 6 Vanessa’s mother asked for the
soldier’s name, but Vanessa did not want anyone getting
involved. Vanessa never reported an incident to the Army’s
Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention
Program (SHARP). 7 She told her mother that she wished to
Class to the rank of Specialist on July 1, 2020. Carolina Sanchez, Timeline: From
Vanessa Guillen’s Disappearance to Fort Hood Review Findings, FOX 26 HOUS.
(Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.fox26houston.com/news/timeline-from-vanessa-guill
ens-disappearance-to-fort-hood-review-findings.
3. Christina Carrega & Luis Martinez, Timeline: What to Know About
Missing Fort Hood Soldier Vanessa Guillen, ABC NEWS (July 14, 2020, 4:31 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-missing-fort-hood-soldier-vanessa-guillen/
story?id=71597714.
4. Andrea Cavallier, Attorney for Family of Missing Solider Vanessa Guillen
Calls on Congress to Launch Investigation Against Fort Hood, NBC NEWS (June
27, 2020, 6:25 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/dateline/attorney-family-missingsoldier-vanessa-guillen-calls-congress-launch-investigation-n1232347.
5. Suspect, Aaron David Robinson, was a Specialist in the Army, Vanessa’s
superior at the time. Diaz et al., supra note 2; Cavallier, supra note 4.
6. Sydney Isenberg, #IAmVanessaGuillen: Fort Hood Soldier’s Story of
Sexual Harassment Shines Light on Rampant Problem in the Military, 25 ABC,
https://www.kxxv.com/hometown/bell-county/iamvanessaguillen-fort-hoodsoldiers-story-of-sexual-harassment-shines-light-on-rampant-problem-in-themilitary (July 6, 2020, 5:21 PM).
7. Tim Stelloh & Andrea Cavallier, Military Investigating Allegations that
Missing Fort Hood Soldier Was Sexually Harassed, NBC NEWS (June 18, 2020,
6:41 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/military-investigating-allegat
ions-missing-fort-hood-soldier-was-sexually-harassed-n1231496; Leah Egan,
Vanessa Guillen: Soldier’s Mom Says a Sergeant Sexually Harassed Daughter
Before She Vanished, Calls for FBI to Take Over Case, CRIME ONLINE (June 9,
2020), https://www.crimeonline.com/2020/06/09/vanessa-guillen-soldiers-momsays-a-sergeant-sexually-harassed-daughter-before-she-vanished-calls-for-fbi-to
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handle the situation herself, and a few weeks later she was
gone. 8 Sixty-eight days after Vanessa’s captain reported her
missing, human remains were found near the Leon River in
Bell County, Texas. 9 Shortly after, it was confirmed that the
remains belonged to Vanessa. 10 Vanessa had not left the base
alive. A fellow soldier murdered Vanessa after summoning
her via text to his workplace on the base. 11 The perpetrator
murdered Vanessa and transported her body to the spot
where her remains were found. 12
Vanessa Guillén’s tragic story spawned a movement, one
that would shine a new light on the decades long cycle of
sexual violence in the military, and the institutional and
legislative failures that allowed it to endure. 13 From social
media accounts on Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook
dedicated to the search for Vanessa, the #iamvanessguillen
hashtag was born. 14 The Guillén family encouraged other
members of the military to use the hashtag to share their
stories, and they did. 15 Today, the #iamvanessaguillen
Facebook page has amassed over 39,000 posts, 16 becoming
the center of the military’s “#MeToo Movement.” 17 Victims
-take-over-case-exclusive/.
8. Egan, supra note 7.
9. Diaz et al., supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Carrega & Martinez, supra note 3.
13. See infra Parts I, II.B.
14. Isenberg, supra note 6; Carrega & Martinez, supra note 3.
15. Isenberg, supra note 6.
16. #iamvanessaguillen, FACEBOOK https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/iam
vanessaguillen (last visited May 28, 2022).
17. Wyatt Grantham-Phillips, Fort Hood Soldier’s Death Sparks Online
Outcry: ‘The Military Hasn’t Had Their #MeToo Movement Yet,’ USA TODAY (July
6, 2020, 6:52 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/07/06/
vanessa-guillens-death-spotlights-sexual-assault-harassment-military/5383313
002/; Press Release, Rep. Jackie Speier, Rep. Speier Chairs Hearing on the
Military’s #MeToo Moment, Sparked by SPC Vanessa Guillén (July 29, 2020),
https://speier.house.gov/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=873CA87E-2B74-4A0
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detail instances of harassment, stalking, and assault, as well
as further taunting and acts of aggression from fellow service
members when they dared to file a report. 18 Others discuss
their careers in the military being destroyed due to
retaliatory reprimands, 19 and their psychological well-being
shattered. All the while their abusers only ever lost one rank
or were shuffled into different units, their military careers
left wholly intact. 20
C-965B-ACA9974F912B; Georgia Turner, Post to #iamvanessaguillen, FACEBOOK
(June 24, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/iamvanessaguillen (“I was
sexually assaulted in my rack while I was pregnant. When I reported it, they told
me I was a liar. So I posted my story on the command page here and tagged my
Capt. NCIS called me in ten minutes. The guy eventually confessed and got
ONLY 2 years in the brig and now lives a happy life out in San Diego California.
I was ridiculed by leadership. I was ostracized by shipmates. I was victim
shamed, and lastly… nothing was done about any of it. . . . It’s always politics
over people.”); Emily Marie, Post to #iamvanessaguillen, FACEBOOK (June 24,
2020), https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/iamvanessaguillen (“The military
sucks for women. It doesn’t matter if you’re a PFC or an officer, a sergeant or a
gunny. Changes are you WILL be harassed, you WILL be assaulted, and most
likely our command won’t really care. They’ll sweep it under the rug, they’ll make
you face your assailant every day as if nothing was wrong . . . .”); Alyssa Carrasco,
Post to #iamvanessaguillen, FACEBOOK (July 8, 2020), https://www.face
book.com/hashtag/iamvanessaguillen (“[W]ithin a week after taking this picture
I would be sexually assaulted by a man who was in charge of the barracks. Little
did I know that the Navy would fail me the way they had. It wasn’t just word of
mouth it was caught on camera. It was brought in front of the NCIS. It still got
brushed under the rug. I was told he had more rights than I did. . . . And yes he
still works there. Actually got a promotion before I was discharged. . . . The
military fails women daily. When this picture was taken I was convinced I would
retire from the Navy. [A] month after it was taken I was begging to get out.”).
18. Sandra Huff, Post to #iamvanessaguillen, FACEBOOK (July 1, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/iamvanessaguillen (“Myself and almost every
single woman I’ve ever served with have stories about harassment, stalking, or
assault.”); Trista Vlcek, Post to #iamvanessaguillen, FACEBOOK (July 3, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/iamvanessaguillen (“While at school, one of
the men, in my class, from the hotel asked if I had a fun weekend. Another one
told me not to say a word. That’s when I finally realized what happened to me.).
19. Vlcek, supra note 18 (“The next few weeks were unbelievable. The unit
sent me to the psych ward, my lawyer told me there was a huge lack of evidence,
and the commander gave me an LOR [(Letter of Reprimand)] for attending a
party, with alcohol, as a minor. I had to march and report to the commander in
the same formation as my abusers.”).
20. Huff, supra note 18 (“My career was essentially over. I stopped caring. My
only focus was getting out honorably for my family. I’m out now. Medically,
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The outpouring of heart-wrenching stories from both
women and men, pushed House and Senate members to
create a bill in honor of Vanessa. Two hundred and seven cosponsors signed on to the current version of the bill, and one
hundred and eighty-seven signed on to its predecessor. Even
with significant support, both versions ended up where
almost all legislation intent on altering the military’s
approach to sexual violence go—the House and Senate
Committee on Armed Services—where they currently sit
with no vote in sight. 21 The most recent bill, if passed, would
have essentially overhauled the military’s prosecutorial,
adjudicatory, investigatory, and statutory approach to sexrelated offenses. This “overhauling” approach made the road
to passage and implementation a difficult one. 22 While bills
which appear to completely rework a system may seem like
the correct path to successful reform, often times, these
expansive pieces of legislation try to do too much and too
little all at the same time.
Although the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act currently sits in
committee with its future uncertain, positive reform is
taking place. In December 2021, President Joe Biden signed
into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
because my mental health never recovered. 4 years later and he is still in the
Marine Corps, with his rank, leading Marines.”).
21. The first iteration of the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act was introduced on
September 16, 2020; and the second version was introduced on May 13, 2021.
I Am Vanessa Guillén Act of 2021, S. 1611, 117th Cong.; I Am Vanessa Guillén
Act of 2021, H.R. 3224, 117th Cong.; I Am Vanessa Guillén Act of 2020, H.R.
8270, 116th Cong.; see also ‘I Am Vanessa Guillen Act of 2020’ Introduced in the
U.S. House, TX. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 16, 2020, 3:33 PM), https://www.tpr.org/news
/2020-09-16/i-am-vanessa-guillen-act-of-2020-introduced-in-the-u-s-house; H.R.
8270 (116th): I Am Vanessa Guillen Act of 2020, GOVTRACK, https://www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/116/hr8270 (last visited May 28, 2022) (stating that the
bill died after being introduced on September 16, 2020, in a previous Congress,
but did not receive a vote); David C. Adams, Congress to Let Military Reform Bill
#IAmVanessaGuillen Die Without A Vote, UNIVISION (Dec. 13, 2020, 12:06 PM),
https://www.univision.com/univision-news/united-states/congress-lets-iamvanes
saguillen-military-reform-bill-die.
22. Cf. The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process.
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Year 2022 (2022 NDAA). 23 Within the 2022 NDAA,
provisions exist which closely mirror the most significant
aspects of the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act. 24 The 2022 NDAA
provisions create a prosecutorial office outside the chain of
command, a standalone offense for sexual harassment, and
an independent investigatory process for allegations of
sexual harassment. 25 Although intent on fixing a system of
self-regulation that has failed on a massive scale, the
provisions within the 2022 NDAA will likely fall short of
producing any substantial change within the military itself.
This Comment is the first to examine the 2022 NDAA’s
approach to sex-related offenses in the armed forces and lays
out how its provisions take a positive step forward, but one
which is altogether too limited.
This Comment will proceed in three parts. Part I
provides history on the military’s sexual offense crisis and
introduces the changes instituted by the 2022 NDAA
provisions. Part II explores the good, the bad, and the ugly of
the military’s approach to sex-related offenses, and why
while the 2022 NDAA’s fractured approach was prudent, it

23. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 §§ 531,
539D, 543, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541, 1692–94, 1699–1700, 1709–10
(2021) [hereinafter 2022 NDAA] (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 824a, 934 note, 1561).
24. Provisions within the 2022 NDAA create an Office for the Special Trial
Counsel which echoes the Office of the Chief Prosecutor outlined in the I Am
Vanessa Guillén Act. Compare 2022 NDAA, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1692–94 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 824a), with H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 2(a) (2021); S. 1611, 117th
Cong., § 2(a) (2021); H.R. 8270, 116th Cong., § 2(a) (2020); and S. 4600, 116th
Cong., § 2(a) (2020). The 2022 NDAA also establishes a standalone offense for
sexual harassment which was also written into the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act.
Compare 2022 NDAA, § 539D, 135 Stat. at 1699–1700 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934
note), with H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 3(a) (2021); S. 1611, 117th Cong., § 3(a)
(2021); H.R. 8270, 116th Cong., § 3(a) (2020); and S. 4600, 116th Cong., § 3(a)
(2020). Lastly, the 2022 NDAA requires an “independent” investigation be
undertaken for any formal complaints of sexual harassment which was also a
required provision within the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act. Compare 2022 NDAA,
§ 543(a), 135 Stat. at 1709–10 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1561), with H.R 8270, 116th
Cong., § 3(b); S. 4600, 116th Cong., § 3(b); H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 3(b) (2021);
and S. 1611, 117th Cong., § 3(b) (2021).
25. 2022 NDAA, §§ 531, 539D, 543, 135 Stat. at 1692–94, 1699–1700.
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will still ultimately fail to produce any substantive reform.
Finally, Part III explores a possible remedy which could be
utilized to aid in truly transforming the military’s approach
to sex-related offenses.
I.

A BROKEN SYSTEM: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
MILITARY SEXUAL OFFENSES

Over the last four decades the military’s sexual violence
crisis has continued to increase at a rapid pace. The policies
and procedures currently in place have failed to remedy the
problem. And no changes have been instituted in an attempt
to either lower the instances of sexual violence or increase
victim reporting and overall case disposition. This Part
explores the military’s current approach to sex-related
offenses and the harm it causes, as well as the 2022 NDAA’s
attempts to rectify the military’s failed judicial system.
A. The Military’s Sexual Violence Crisis
Vanessa Guillén’s story is one of hundreds of thousands.
Over the last thirty years, numerous scandals and tragedies
have cropped up across each military branch. While
temporarily shining a light on the military’s failure to
address its sexual violence problem, the light eventually
fizzles out, and in the end, no meaningful change is made.
Each scandal shares a similar pattern: the military
acknowledges the problem and proceeds to make
insignificant personnel changes in order to assuage concerns.
Throughout the 1990s numerous abuse scandals began
to pop up across multiple military branches. 26 At one facility
dozens of woman filed complaints of sexual advances ranging
from unwanted touching to forcible sodomy. 27 Those
26. See THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012); Jackie Spinner, In
Wake of Sex Scandal, Caution Is the Rule at Aberdeen, WASH. POST., Nov. 7, 1997,
at B1, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/aberdeen/
caution.htm.
27. See THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012).
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disclosures resulted in thousands of abuse complaints from
service members across the country pouring into a special
Army hotline. 28 At the Air Force Academy, between 1993–
2003, women made over one hundred official allegations of
assaults and men made three. 29 High ranking Air Force
generals knew of the assaults yet failed to take action,
spending more effort on victim-blaming than remediation. 30
While these disturbing instances of sexual misconduct
resulted in top commanders being “reassigned” or forced to
retire, and some of the perpetrators being sent to prison, no
major or minor overhaul was ever taken by any of the
military branches or Congress. 31
One of the most infamous military sexual scandals took
place at the 35th annual Tailhook Symposium. The annual
convention began as a reunion of naval aviators in Tijuana,
Mexico, in 1956. 32 The symposium moved to Las Vegas in
1963 and expanded to include a number of professional
development activities with substantial naval support. 33
While some may regard the symposium as a harmless
28. See id.; Spinner, supra note 26.
29. THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012); Clara Bingham, Code
of Dishonor, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 6, 2006), https://www.vanityfair.com
/news/2003/12/airforce200312.
30. THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012); Bingham, supra note
29.
31. Though changes were made to the Academy’s internal structure and old
policies were newly reinforced, no overarching policies or procedures changed
within the armed forces. See THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012);
Bingham, supra note 29; Spinner, supra note 26.
32. DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., TAILHOOK 91 – PART 1, REVIEW OF
NAVY INVESTIGATIONS 1 (1992) [hereinafter TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 1],
https://ncisahistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/DoDIG-Report-of-Investiga
tion-Tailhook-91-Review-of-the-Navy-Investigations.pdf.
THE

33. The majority of the planning for the convention’s official functions was
generally conducted by the office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. The
Navy provided free office space to the organization at Naval Air Station,
Miramar, in California, and used the Navy’s extensive fleet of passenger aircrafts
to transport attendees to Las Vegas. In 1991 alone, the Navy used some twentyseven C-9 flights to transport approximately 1,600 people to the convention.
TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 1, supra note 32, at 1–2.
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military tradition, in fact, it was a hunting ground for
predators. The annual Tailhook convention was well known
throughout the naval aviation community for its wild
partying, heaving drinking, and lewd behavior. 34 After the
1985 convention, Vice Admiral Edward H. Martin and a
squadron commander then serving on the Tailhook Board of
Directors reached out with significant concerns as to the
conduct of the convention’s attendees. 35 However, even after
voicing such concerns, the activities and behaviors of the
participants would continue over the next several years.
The years of misconduct at the Tailhook Convention
finally came to a head at its 35th anniversary in 1991. On
the third day of the symposium, at approximately 11:30 PM,
Paula Coughlin, aide to Rear Admiral John W. Snyder,
arrived alone to the third-floor hallway of the Hilton Hotel. 36
As she approached the hallway, she found it to be lined by
men on both sides. 37 As she attempted to walk up the
hallway, she was grabbed both on her buttocks and her
breasts. 38 When she yelled at the men asking them what they
were doing, they did not respond and continued to grope

34. Id.; 140 CONG. REC. 1908 (1994) (statement of Rep. Schroeder on Respect
for Men and Women in Uniform).
35. Describing the event as “a rambunctious drunken melee,” Vice Admiral
Martin’s concerns were for the Navy’s reputation stating, “We can ill afford this
type of behavior and indeed must not tolerate it. The Navy, not the individual,
his organization or the Tailhook Association, is charged with the events and
certainly will be cast in disreputable light.” TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 1, supra
note 32, at 2–3; Associated Press, Tailhook Member Warned of ‘Rowdiness’ 7
Years Ago, DESERET NEWS (Oct. 10, 1992, 2:00 AM), https://www.deseret.com/19
92/10/10/19009662/tailhook-member-warned-of-rowdiness-7-years-ago; see also
Brenda Camp Gordon Orbell, Discourse, Power, and Social Rupture: An Analysis
of Tailhook 91 (Dec. 1997) (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University)
(ProQuest).
36. DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., TAILHOOK 91 – PART 2, EVENTS AT
35TH ANNUAL TAILHOOK SYMPOSIUM, at VI-12 (1993) [hereinafter TAILHOOK
91 REPORT PART 2], https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA269008.pdf; TAILHOOK 91
REPORT PART 1, supra note 32, at 3–4.
THE

37. TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 2, supra note 36, at VI-12, F-26.
38. Id. at F-26–27.
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her. 39 When Ms. Coughlin was finally able to break free, she
ran into an open door that led to an administrative suite. 40
Ms. Coughlin was one of eighty-three women and seven men
assaulted over the four-day convention. 41
Ms. Coughlin first reported the assault on the morning
of September 8th, to the commander to whom she was an
aide. 42 At that time he suggested, “[t]hat’s what you get for
going down a hallway of a bunch of drunken aviators.” 43 On
September 29th, Ms. Coughlin sent a letter to the Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations. 44 His superior, Admiral Jerome
Johnson, read the letter and immediately ordered a criminal
investigation. 45 The Navy’s investigation only identified a
handful of the assaulting officers. 46 The Pentagon proceeded
to conduct its own investigation. 47 The Pentagon report
found a total of 117 officers engaged “in one or more incidents
of indecent assault, indecent exposure, conduct unbecoming

39. Id.
40. Ms. Coughlin later said, “I was appalled not only by the brutality of the
incident, but the fact that the group did that to me knowing I was both a fellow
officer and an admiral’s aide” Id. at F-27. A Federal Government civilian
employee had witnessed Ms. Coughlin enter the hallway and stated “[a]s she
advanced through the area, the gauntlet collapsed around her . . . . There were
approximately 100 men in the hallway at the time . . . .” Id.; see also Coughlin v.
Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 1997).
41. See TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 2, supra note 36, at I-1, app. F.
42. See Joslyn Ogden, Tailhook ‘91 and the U.S. Navy, KENAN INST. FOR
ETHICS 7–8, https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Tailhook
USNavy_Case2015.pdf (last visited May 28, 2022).
43. Kenneth B. Noble, Tailhook Whistle-Blower Recalls Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1994, at A12, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/04/us/tailhook-whistleblower-recalls-attack.html.
44. TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 1, supra note 32, at 4; Ogden, supra note 43, at
8–9.
45. See TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 1, supra note 32, at 4.
46. John Lancaster, Tailhook Probe Implicates 140 Officers: Pentagon Report
Calls 90 Assaults at Navy Convention a ‘Failure of Leadership,’ WASH. POST, Apr.
24, 1993, at A1, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/04/24/tail
hook-probe-implicates-140-officers/e004554a-0440-4371-b8a9-a2ecaad05785/.
47. Id.
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an officer or failure to act in a proper leadership capacity.” 48
The probe also identified fifty-one participants who allegedly
lied to investigators. 49
In the end two admirals stepped down, and three others
received censures, yet most of the 1991 Tailhook Convention
cases were dropped, exonerated, received nonpunitive letters
or counseling, or received a fine of $500–2,000 and a letter of
reprimand. 50 None of the perpetrators involved in the
“gauntlet” received any form of severe punishment. 51 No
overarching or broad military policies changed even though
the years of misconduct at the Tailhook Convention was well

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Out of the 140 implicated, 118 were in the Navy and 22 were in the
Marines. Sixty-two of the Navy cases were dismissed for lack of evidence. Fortytwo were sent to “admiral mast” which is a form of disciplinary hearing. Of the
forty-two, two were exonerated, twelve received nonpunitive letters or
counseling, and twenty-eight received fines between $500–2,000 and a letter of
reprimand. Five of the individuals from the Navy implicated rejected the offer of
admiral mast, and after meeting with “fact-finding boards” all five were cleared
of wrongdoing. Of the cases involving Marines, prosecutors dropped three cases,
six were exonerated, eleven received fines and a letter of reprimand, and two
were court martialed. WILLIAM H. MCMICHAEL, THE MOTHER OF ALL HOOKS: THE
STORY OF THE U.S. NAVY’S TAILHOOK SCANDAL 102–26 (1997); see also Susanne M.
Schafer, Two Navy Admirals Removed in Tailhook Scandal, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 24, 1992), https://apnews.com/article/95ed506e8e19069c903940c26
a3193ae; Neil A. Lewis, Tailhook Affair Brings Censure of 3 Admirals, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993, at 1, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/16/us/tailhookaffair-brings-censure-of-3-admirals.html. Individuals implicated who were
members of the Navy were sent to an “admiral mast,” a proceeding at which an
admiral in the U.S. Navy hears and disposes of the case. See Admiral’s Mast,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Those in the Marines were sent to a
hearing referred to as “office hours.” Both of these are considered “non-judicial”
forms of punishment. MCMICHAEL, supra, at 114–116. Both of these are
considered “non-judicial” forms of punishment. MCMICHAEL, supra, at 111–18;
Nonjudicial Punishment: Service Culture Divides in Military Justice, HG.ORG,
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/nonjudicial-punishment-service-culture-divid
es-in-military-justice-20041 (last visited May 28, 2022).
51. See Robert L. Beck, Tailhook Scandal Set Stage for Gender Equality Fight,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Sept. 1, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.sandiegounion
tribune.com/opinion/commentary/sdut-utbg-tailhook-navy-women-2016sep01story.html.
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known to superior officers. 52 And though thousands of Naval
jobs were cut and promotions delayed, Congress took no
legislative action to solve the serious problems raised by the
Tailhook scandal or any of the other serious incidents of
military sexual misconduct. 53
While these scandals confirm that a problem exists, they
fail to highlight the breadth of the crisis. Since 2010, the
Department of Defense (DoD) “estimates that roughly
135,000 active duty Service members (65,400 women and
69,600 men) have been sexually assaulted, and about
509,000 active duty Service members (223,000 women and
52. TAILHOOK 91 REPORT PART 1, supra note 32, at 2–3; David Evans, Probe of
Wild Navy Party Halts Promotions, CHI. TRIB. (June 10, 1992), https://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-06-10-9202210511-story.html.
53. See Evans, supra note 52; see also Kingsley R. Browne, Military Sex
Scandals from Tailhook to the Present: The Cure Can be Worse than the Disease,
14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 749, 758 (2007) (documenting Tailhook, its
aftermath, and subsequent military sex scandals). The only legislation presented
in response to the Tailhook Scandal that related to sexual misconduct was two
concurrent resolutions introduced in Congress. Calling on the Secretary of
Defense to Complete a Full Investigation into Alleged Sexual Harassment of
Women at the Symposium of the Tailhook Association in September 1991, H.R.
Con. Res. 344, 102d Cong. (1992); Expressing the Sense of the Congress
Regarding the Elimination of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault in the
Armed Forces, H.R. Con. Res. 359, 102d Cong. (1992). While concurrent
resolutions must be passed in the same form by both houses, they do not require
the signature of the president nor do they have the force of law. Types of
Legislation, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/
leg_laws_acts.htm (last visited May 28, 2022). Concurrent resolutions are often
passed to set the time of Congress’ adjournments, or to convey congratulations to
another country on the anniversary of its independence. Id. In the case of the two
concurrent resolutions introduced after the Tailhook Scandal, both were sent to
the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation and were never
brought up for a vote. Viewed through the “Committees” section on the
legislation’s page on Congress.gov the only action for both Concurrent
Resolutions was their referral to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and
Compensation. Calling on the Secretary of Defense to Complete a Full
Investigation into Alleged Sexual Harassment of Women at the Symposium of
the Tailhook Association in September 1991, H.R. Con. Res. 344, 102d Cong.
(1992), https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-concurrent-resolutio
n/344/committees=310&s=1; Expressing the Sense of the Congress Regarding the
Elimination of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces, H.R.
Con. Res. 359, 102d Cong. (1992), https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress
/house-concurrent-resolution/359/committees?r=5&s=1.
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286,000 men) have experienced sexual harassment.” 54 In
2018 alone, an estimated 20,500 service members
experienced instances of sexual assault, which, compared to
the 14,900 estimated in 2016, is a substantial increase. 55
Even though estimates of sexual assault and sexual
harassment continue to rise, instances of sexual violence
actually reported only make up a fraction of the total, and
the number of reports leading to trial is constantly
shrinking. 56
The military’s approach to sexual offenses has led to a
substantial increase in instances of sexual violence and a
significant decrease in victim reporting. The armed forces’
inaction has led to intervention from non-military actors in
the hopes of making a dent in these disturbing figures.

54. LYNN ROSENTHAL ET AL., INDEP. REV. COMM’N ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE
MIL., HARD TRUTHS AND THE DUTY TO CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 11 (2021)
[hereinafter IRC REPORT] (footnote omitted), https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/
02/2002755437/-1/-1/0/irc-full-report-final-1923-7-1-21.pdf/irc-full-report-final1923-7-1-21.pdf.
55. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, DEP’T OF DEF.
ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MIL. 5 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 DOD ANNUAL
REPORT]; Press Release, Sen. Kristen Gillibrand, After Recent Department of
Defense Report Highlights Its Continued Failure to Address Crisis of Military
Sexual Assault, Gillibrand Leads Bipartisan Group of Senators to Reintroduce
Military Justice Improvement Act and Calls on Congress to Act (June 13, 2019),
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/news/press/release/after-recent-departmentof-defense-report-highlights-its-continued-failure-to-address-crisis-of-militarysexual-assault-gillibrand-leads-bipartisan-group-of-senators-to-reintroducemilitary-justice-improvement-act-and-calls-on-congress-to-act.
56. The only type of reports which lead to an investigation and possible case
disposition are unrestricted reports. 2018 DOD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at
app. B-5. There were 5,805 unrestricted reports in 2018, 5,699 in 2019, and 5,640
in 2020. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, DEP’T OF DEF.
ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MIL., at app. B-7 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 DOD
ANNUAL REPORT]; DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE,
DEP’T OF DEF. ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MIL., at app. B-7 (2019)
[hereinafter 2019 DOD ANNUAL REPORT]; 2018 DOD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
55, at app. B-7. Of those unrestricted reports that were reported to court-martial
in 2018 only 307 went to trial, in 2019 only 363, and in 2020 only 255. 2018 DOD
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at app. B-22; 2019 DOD ANNUAL REPORT, supra,
at app. B-22; 2020 DOD ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at app. B-23.
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B. Attempts at Reform: The 2022 National Defense
Authorization Act
The 2022 NDAA attempts to significantly impact how
the military deals with sexual violence by limiting a
commander’s expansive authority. Unlike civilian
communities, military commanders exercise discretion in
deciding whether an offense should be charged and how the
offender should be punished. 57 This broad authority can
result in actions ranging from a court-martial to no
punishment at all. 58
“Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the United States
Constitution gives Congress a primary if not plenary role in
military justice matters.” 59 It states that Congress has the
authority “[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” 60 The greatest use
of this authority to date occurred in 1950 when the 81st
Congress passed an act to unify, consolidate, revise, and
codify “the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government
of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard.” 61
Even though the Constitution provides Congress with the
power and authority to modify or change the rules which
govern the armed forces, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) has been modified only a handful of times. 62

57. Military Justice Overview, VICTIM &. WITNESS ASSISTANCE COUNCIL,
https://vwac.defense.gov/military.aspx (last visited May 28, 2022).
58. Id.
59. Victor Hansen, Military Justice Reform: An Overview, 27 FED. SENT’G REP.
88, 88 (2014).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
61. This Act, in essence, created the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (1950)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946a).
62. The first modification made to the UCMJ since its inception was in 1968,
when Congress created the military judiciary, provided for judge-alone trial, and
required that judges and counsel be appointed for special court-marital. In the
Military Justice Act of 1983, Congress provided for Supreme Court review of
court-martial convictions, interlocutory appeals, and simplified post-trial
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The 2022 NDAA attempts to rectify Congress’ inaction by
removing judicial authority outside of the chain of command.
These provisions challenge the military’s current
prosecutorial, investigatory, adjudicatory, and statutory
approach to sexual offenses.
1. The Office of the Special Trial Counsel
Section 531 of the 2022 NDAA attempts to remove
control from commanders by creating and implementing an
independent prosecutorial office: the Office of the Special
Trial Counsel. 63 This office will have authority over “covered
offenses” including murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
assault, stalking, retaliation, rape, sexual assault, other
sexual misconduct, and any attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation to commit any covered offense. 64 The Judge
Advocate General has the authority to appoint both the lead
special trial counsel and the special trial counsel.
The Special Trial Counsel is a commissioned officer and
a member of the bar who is qualified, by reason of education,
training, experience, and temperament. 65 The lead Special
Trial Counsel, in addition to the requirements needed for the
processing. In 2013, 2014, and 2015, Congress required additional training and
support in dealing with sex-related offenses, through the National Defense
Authorization Act. Finally, 2016 marked the biggest change to the UCMJ since
it was signed by President Harry S. Truman. In 2016, Congress passed another
Military Justice Act which reorganized, reviewed, and updated the UCMJ. With
all of these changes, however, no major impact was made to alter the armed
forces’ approach to sex-related offenses. David A. Schlueter, Reforming Military
Justice: An Analysis of the Military Justice Act of 2016, 49 SAINT MARY’S L.J. 1,
12–13 (2018); Tomora Nance, Changes to UCMJ: Military Justice Act of 2016
Brings About Training, U.S. ARMY (May 17, 2018), https://www.army.mil/
article/205545/changes_to_ucmj_military_justice_act_of_2016_brings_about_tra
ining; Meghann Myers, Here’s What You Need to Know About the Biggest Update
to UCMJ in Decades, MIL. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com
/news/your-army/2019/01/15/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-biggest-up
date-to-ucmj-in-decades/.
63. 2022 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §§ 531, 135 Stat. 1541, 1692–94 (2021)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 824a).
64. 2022 NDAA, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1693; 10 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(2).
65. 2022 NDAA, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1692; 10 U.S.C. § 824a(b)(1)(A)-(B).
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special trial counsel, must be in a grade no lower than O-7,
equivalent to a Brigadier General. 66 A crucial duty of the lead
Special Trial Counsel is to ensure that the office remains
independent of either the victim or accused chain of
command and that all office activities are “free from unlawful
or unauthorized influence or coercion.” 67
One of the most critical aspects of this newly created
office is the authority of the Special Trial Counsel to
determine whether a crime falls within the office’s purview.
Section 531 provides the Special Trial Counsel with the
exclusive authority to either refer the charges for trial by
court-martial, withdraw or dismiss the charges, or enter a
plea agreement. 68 Should charges fall under the Special Trial
Counsel’s control, they have complete authority to refer the
charges to a general or special court-martial. 69 While victim’s
and accused’s commanders can provide input, the special
trial counsel is not obligated to abide by their
recommendation. 70 And the determination of a special trial
counsel to refer charges to a court-martial for trial is
binding. 71 In the event the Special Trial Counsel decides not

66. 2022 NDAA, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1692; 10 U.S.C. § 824a(b)(2). Under the I
Am Vanessa Guillén Act the Chief Prosecutor only needs to be in a grade above
O-6. H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 2(a)(2) (2021); S. 1611, 117th Cong., § 2(a)(2)
(2021); H.R. 8270, 116th Cong., § 2(a)(2) (2020); S. 4600, 116th Cong., § 2(a)(2)
(2020). A grade of O-6 signifies a commissioned officer in the position of Colonel.
A grade of O-7 signifies a commissioned officer in the position of Brigadier
General. The highest grade is a O-10; a four-star general. A five-star general falls
under a “Special” category. See Rank Insignia of the U.S. Armed Forces, ARMY,
https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/symbols/ranks.pdf (last visited May 28,
2022).
67. 2022 NDAA, § 532, 135 Stat. at 1694–95; 10 U.S.C. § 1044f(a)(3)(A)-(B).
The I Am Vanessa Guillén Act also required the Chief Prosecutor to be
independent and outside the chain of command of the victim and accused. See
H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 2(b) (2021); S. 1611, 117th Cong., § 2(b) (2021); H.R.
8270, 116th Cong., § 2(b) (2020); S. 4600, 116th Cong. § 2(b) (2020).
68. 2022 NDAA, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1692–93; 10 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(2)-(3).
69. See id.
70. 2022 NDAA, § 532, 135 Stat. at 1695; 10 U.S.C. § 1044f(a)(5).
71. 2022 NDAA, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1693; 10 U.S.C. § 824a(a)(4).
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to proceed, the accused’s commander may exercise any of
their authorities outside of convening a court-martial. This
may include non-judicial punishment or administrative
action. 72
This new office is meant to eliminate commander
discretion by giving charging authority to an individual
outside of the chain of command. The intent being that an
outsider will be less biased and more dedicated to correctly
prosecuting the case. However, the lead Special Trial
Counsel is still a commissioned officer who, based on the
required grade of O-7 or higher, has been in the military for
decades. 73 This still leaves resounding concerns about
whether this office is sufficiently independent.

72. 2022 NDAA, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1693; 10 U.S.C. § 824a(a)(5). Commanders
still have the ability to impose administrative action or non-judicial punishment.
Administrative action is not meant to be punitive but rehabilitative and can
range from counseling, reprimand, or involuntary separation. Military Justice
Overview, supra note 57. Non-judicial punishment under Article 15 is a means of
handling minor offenses requiring immediate corrective action. Nonjudicial
punishment hearings are non-adversarial and require the commander to be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the service member committed the
offense. The maximum punishment depends on the rank of the commander
imposing the punishment and the rank of the service member being punished,
but can include suspension from duty, confinement to quarters (no more than
thirty consecutive days), or forfeiture of no more than one-half of one month’s pay
for two months. Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 815.
73. Time-in-service (TIS) and time-in-grade (TIG) influence officer
promotions the most. TIS equals the total time that someone is in the Army. An
officer must spend a given amount of time in each grade prior to advancement to
the next grade and he or she typically cannot skip grades. To reach the grade of
Colonel (O-6) a commissioned officers time in service must be twenty-two years,
plus or minus, one year. Rod Powers, Army Commissioned Officer Career Path,
BALANCE CAREERS (July 28, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/armycommissioned-officer-career-information-3345007. A promotion board reviews
the officers who want a promotion to general—but the competition is tough and
“only the most qualified O-6 candidates will be chosen.” The board considers the
candidate’s leadership results and the service needs. From those promotion board
recommendations, the president of the United States then nominates an officer,
and the Senate confirms or denies the promotion. After 20 to 30 years of military
service, a general will be promoted to that rank. Tim Plaehn, What Does It Take
To Be a General in the Military?, CAREER TREND (July 5, 2017), https://career
trend.com/general-military-37191.html.
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2. Sexual Harassment: A Standalone Offense and
Independent Investigative Process
In addition to creating an independent prosecutorial
office, two other provisions of the 2022 NDAA alter the
military’s statutory and procedural processes for sexual
harassment. Section 539D creates a standalone offense for
sexual harassment within the UCMJ, 74 and section 543
constructs an independent investigatory process for formal
complaints of sexual harassment. 75 While each addresses a
different aspect of the overall development of a case, together
they significantly transform the military’s current approach
to sexual harassment.
Under the UCMJ sexual harassment may be charged
under four different articles, none of which are specifically
designed for such an offense. 76 The 2022 NDAA creates a
74. See 2022 NDAA, § 539D(a)(1), 135 Stat. at 1699–1700; 10 U.S.C. § 934
note; H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 3 (2021); S. 1611, 117th Cong., § 3 (2021); H.R.
8270, 116th Cong., § 3 (2020); S. 4600, 116th Cong., § 3 (2020).
75. 2022 NDAA, § 543(a), 135 Stat. at 1709–10; 10 U.S.C. § 1561.
76. Sexual harassment can be charged under Article 92 “Failure to obey order
or regulation,” Article 93 “Cruelty and maltreatment,” Article 133 “Conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” or Article 134 “General Article.” See 10
U.S.C § 892; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES art. 93, at IV-29
(2019); How Does the Military Define Sexual Harassment?, L. OFF. OF JOCELYN C.
STEWART,
https://www.ucmj-defender.com/military-define-sexual-harassment/
(last visited May 28, 2022); 10 U.S.C. § 933; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES art. 133, at IV-134–45 (2019) (“Instances of violation of this article
include . . . using insulting or defamatory language to another officer in that
officer’s presence or about that officer to other military persons . . . committing or
attempting to commit a crime involving moral turpitude.”); see also Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer – Article 133, UCMJ, GONZALEZ & WADDINGTON,
https://www.ucmjdefense.com/resources/military-offenses/conduct-unbecomingan-officer-ucmj-art-133.html (last visited May 28, 2022). Under the manual,
Article 134 includes specific descriptions of offenses which fall within its purview.
“Indecent conduct” and “indecent language” are both listed. The elements for
“indecent conduct” include: “(1) [t]hat the accused engaged in certain conduct; (2)
[t]hat the conduct was indecent; and (3) [t]hat, under the circumstances, the
conduct of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of good order and discipline
in the armed forces; (ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces;
or (iii) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces and of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES art. 134, at IV-148 (2019). The elements for “indecent language”
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standalone offense and renders it chargeable under the
military’s “catch-all” provision, Article 134. 77 Titled the
“General Article,” Article 134 currently lists sixteen specific
offenses in the Manual for Courts-Martial. 78 Though each of
Article 134’s sixteen offenses list their own maximum
punishment, the punishments range drastically from
forfeiture of pay and allowances, a bad-conduct discharge,
and potentially years of confinement. 79
In addition to creating a new cause of action, the 2022
NDAA provisions alter the current investigative process for
sexual harassment complaints. 80 Under existing military
policies and procedures, there are three ways to report an
instance of sexual harassment: formal, informal, or
anonymous complaint. 81 The independent investigation
are virtually identical with the exception of a couple of words: “(1) [t]hat the
accused orally or in writing communicated to another person certain language;
(2) [t]hat such language was indecent; and (3) [t]hat, under the circumstances,
the conduct of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces; (ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces; or (iii) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces and of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. § 934;
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES art. 134, at IV-148 (2019).
77. 2022 NDAA, § 539D(a)(1), 135 Stat. at 1699–1700; 10 U.S.C. § 934 note.
The I Am Vanessa Guillén Act would create a separate article of the UCMJ, art.
120d. H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 3(a) (2021); S. 1611, 117th Cong., § 3(a) (2021);
H.R. 8270, 116th Cong., § 3(a) (2020); S. 4600, 116th, § 3(a) (2020).
78. See MANUAL
(2019).

FOR

COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES art. 134, at IV-135

79. Although the 2022 NDAA provision creates the standalone offense
chargeable under Article 134, it does not list the punishments which can be
initiated. With Article 134’s punishments ranging considerably, without a
distinct punishment, a conviction for sexual harassment could potentially result
in something as minimal as forfeiture of pay. 2022 NDAA, § 539D, 135 Stat. at
1699–1700; 10 U.S.C. § 934 note; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
art. 134, at IV-135–51 (2019).
80. See 2022 NDAA, § 543(a), 135 Stat. at 1709–10; 10 U.S.C. § 1561. The I
Am Vanessa Guillén Act would also alter the military’s policies and procedures
on investigating sexual harassment complaints. H.R. 3224, 117th Cong., § 3(b)
(2021); S. 1611, 117th Cong., § 3(b) (2021); H.R. 8270, 116th Cong., § 3(b) (2020);
S. 4600, 116th Cong., § 3(b) (2020).
81. See Carolyn M. Warner & Mia A. Armstrong, The Role of Military Law
and Systemic Issues in the Military’s Handling of Sexual Assault Cases, 54 LAW
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implemented by section 543 only impacts the formal
complaint process. A formal complaint is initiated by
completion of the DA Form 7746, which documents the
nature of the complaint and the requested remedies. 82
Current policy dictates that the full-time brigade Sexual
Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) must immediately
refer all formal complaints to the Brigade commander. The
commander then requires the complainant to attest to the
form’s accuracy and warns of the potential adverse
consequences for knowingly submitting a false complaint. 83
The complaint is then forwarded onto the first commander in
the chain of command with general court-martial convening
authority. 84
The commander decides whether to appoint an
investigating officer, or initiate an informal inquiry under
his own control. 85 Prior to 2021, Investigating Officers (IOs)
could be any person, who in the opinion of the appointing
authority, is best qualified for the duty by reason of their
education, training, experience, length of service,
demonstrated sound judgment and temperament. 86 But
since March 2021, IOs must come from outside the accuser’s
brigade. 87 At the conclusion of the investigation, a legal
& SOC’Y REV. 265, 272–73 (2020); Army Regul. 600–20, § 7–8(e) (2020),
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN32931-AR_600-20-004WEB-6.pdf.
82. Army Regul. 600–20, § 7–8(n) (2020).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Army Regul. 600–20, § 7–8(n)(9) (2020).
86. Prior to 2021, when a commander instituted a formal investigation, called
a 15–6 investigation, the investigating officer only had to meet certain broad
requirements, but could still be within the accuser’s chain of command. See Army
Regul. 15–6, § 2–3(a) (2016), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a
/pdf/web/r15_6.pdf.
87. Memorandum from Michael X. Garrett, U.S. General, to U.S. Army Forces
Command on Assignment of Investigating Officers for Formal Sexual
Harassment Complaints (n.d.), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/FORSCOM-Memo-Investigating-Officers-for-Sexual-Harassme
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review ensues, 88 and then the commander decides whether
to approve or disprove all or part of the findings and
recommendations, or seek further investigation. 89
As a result of section 543 of the 2022 NDAA, in the event
of a formal complaint, an independent investigator must be
appointed. 90 Within seventy-two hours of receiving a formal
complaint, the commanding officer must forward the formal
complaint onto an independent investigator and the next
superior officer within the chain of command with general
court-martial convening authority. 91 This eliminates the
option of initiating an informal investigation under the
commander’s control. The remainder of the formal complaint
process is left unchanged.
The military’s history with sexual misconduct is one
plagued by scandal, opacity, and mistrust. The 2022 NDAA
provisions attempt to remedy these issues by altering the
nt-11-March-2021.pdf (last visited May 28, 2022); Scott Maucione, Army
Changing How Sexual Harassment Is Investigated, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Mar.
29, 2021, 1:33 PM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/army/2021/03/army-chang
ing-how-sexual-harassment-is-investigated/; Haley Britzky, Almost a Year After
Vanessa Guillén’s Disappearance, the Army Moves Forward with Sexual
Harassment Reform, TASK & PURPOSE (Mar. 26, 2021, 11:14 AM), https://taskand
purpose.com/news/army-forces-command-sexual-harassment-policy/.
88. Army Regul. 600–20, § 7–8(n)(9)(o)-(p) (2020). A legal review involves the
investigation report being sent to the Staff Judge Advocate for a review of the
legal sufficiency of the allegation. U.S. ARMY, SHARP GUIDEBOOK 21–22 (2014),
https://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY14_POTUS/FY14_DoD_Report_to_P
OTUS_Enclosure_1_Army.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20210323184433/htt
ps://www.soc.mil/SWCS/sharp/pdf/SHARP-Guidebook.pdf].
89. Army Regul. 600–20, § 7–8(n)(9)(p) (2020). In addressing how a formal
complaint is resolved, Army Regulation 600-20 states that, “[p]unitive or
administrative actions against a subject do not necessarily change offending
behaviors or rectify the situation for the individual complainant or unit.
Commanders will take corrective action to preclude recurrence of sexual
harassment and address any management deficiencies or other contributing
factors that caused the complaint to be filed. Commanders should review the
investigation to assess factors or perceptions that may have contributed to the
reporting of an unsubstantiated complaint.” Army Regul. 600–20, § 7–8(o) (2020).
90. 2022 NDAA § 543(a), Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541, 1709–10 (2021)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1561(b)).
91. Id.
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military’s sexual violence processes, yet they fail to move the
bar far enough. This failure will likely leave the military and
its sexual violence victims in the same endless cycle of
unreported, uninvestigated, and unadjudicated sexual
offenses.
II. THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE 2022 NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
History has shown that in the wake of tragedy, though
reform is necessary, reform seldom occurs, and legislation
asking for an inch is far better than one demanding a mile.
Massive overhauling bills and attempts at tragedy-induced
change would seem like the most logical path to reform.
However, in retrospect, foundational institutions such as the
military require a subtle, skilled strategy for true change to
occur. Yet, even with the proper procedural approach,
legislation can fail when it refuses to push the substantive
boundary far enough. This Part addresses the 2022 NDAA’s
successes with its piecemeal rather than overhaul approach
to sex-related offenses in the armed forces, as well as its
failures through its perpetuation of military self-regulation.
A. The Road to Reform: The Benefits of the Piecemeal
Approach
While at first blush the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act’s
overhauling approach would appear to be the most efficient
and effective way to implement change, history proves that
real change can only occur through the piecemeal process.
The 2022 NDAA provisions initiated change using the only
method to successfully alter the military’s decades old
approach to sexual offenses. Not the result of tragedy,
scandal, or massive-scale bills, these changes were hidden
away within an expansive, sprawling piece of legislation.
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Congressional action—particularly on a sweeping
scale—is best accomplished in small bites. 92 Breaking reform
into pieces is more politically feasible than enacting
comprehensive change in one fell swoop. 93 This is
particularly true in situations with a high degree of
legislative gridlock, such as the one that exists today. 94 When
parties are extremely polarized, and have differing policy
preferences, high political barriers to major policy revisions
are frequently created both internally and across party lines.
This drives lawmakers to modify policy through incremental
change. 95 Rather than combining all reform measures and
forcing an all-or-nothing vote, often dooming the reform
efforts, legislators can pick and choose what they wish to
support by breaking up comprehensive reform into smaller
pieces. 96
Additionally, the incremental approach is less likely to
92. Cf. Thad Kousser, The Blessings and Curses of Piecemeal Reform, 44 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 569, 583–91 (2011) (discussing the advantages of the piecemeal
approach to constitutional reform); Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, The Legislative
Role in Procedural Rulemaking Through Incremental Reform, 97 NEB. L. REV.
762, 799–806 (2019) (discussing the advantages of incremental procedural
changes to impact substantive law); Tony Payan, Immigration Reform: A
Comprehensive vs. Piecemeal Approach, in 2013 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 87, 90–91 (James A. Baker III Inst. for Pub. Pol’y of
Rice Univ. 2013) (discussing the advantages of the piecemeal approach to
immigration reform); Elizabeth C. Price, The Evolution of Health Care DecisionMaking: The Political Paradigm and Beyond, 65 TENN. L. REV. 619, 630–32 (1998)
(addressing the successful use of the piecemeal approach in both state and federal
healthcare reform).
93. Kousser, supra note 92, at 586–87.
94. Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96, 93 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 519, 519–20 (1999); Lee Drutman, How Much Longer Can This Era
of Political Gridlock Last?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 4, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-longer-can-this-era-of-politicalgridlock-last/; Ed Kilgore, Today’s Gridlock Is Like a 19th-Century Nightmare,
N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 6, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/
2021/03/todays-gridlock-is-like-a-19th-century-nightmare.html.
95. See Binder, supra note 94, at 528–30 (addressing the high level of
legislative gridlock with high polarization and wide policy preferences within the
parties both internally and externally); Rosenbaum, supra note 92, at 804–05.
96. Kousser, supra note 92, at 586–87.
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receive public notice, especially if the proposed procedural
changes are buried in a larger substantive reform package. 97
“When major policy occurs at critical junctures, existing
special issues groups mobilize to bring public attention to the
affected social or public issue.” 98 “When lawmakers state a
substantive policy and promise to act on its merits—[the
public] listens.” 99 By contrast, incremental change is harder
to see. 100 The I Am Vanessa Guillén Act and the 2022 NDAA
highlight this challenge of too much transparency. Following
the introduction of the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act, promises
made by legislators led to widespread media coverage and
increased debate. 101 This led to too much public notice and
stalled the reform process. Meanwhile, the 2022 NDAA
inserted provisions within a substantial reform package that
is annually renewed, resulting in far less attention and no
red flag being raised. This allowed the 2022 NDAA
provisions to fly under the public radar.
In a time with deep political polarization and internal
party squabbling, the piecemeal approach can be the
necessary solution to implement change. One recent example
of this is President Biden’s proposed Build Back Better
Bill. 102 Its massive overhaul of critical policy areas resulted
97. Rosenbaum, supra note 92, at 810–11.
98. Id. at 813.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Christopher Brito, House Will Vote on Bill Named After Slain Fort Hood
Soldier Vanessa Guillén, CBS NEWS (Sept. 17, 2020, 12:12 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/vanessa-guillen-bill-military-sexual-assaultharrassment-house-vote/ (quoting Congresswoman Jackie Speier as stating that
the bill would be put to a vote “either in the next few weeks or it will be in
November”); Veronica Stracqualursi, Lawmakers Unveil Bipartisan Bill Named
After Vanessa Guillen to Change Sexual Harassment Reporting in Military, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/16/politics/vanessa-guillen-house-bill-militarysexual-harassment/index.html (Sept. 16, 2020, 8:20 PM).
102. See Jeremy Dillon et al., What’s Ahead for ‘Build Back Better’: 4 Scenarios,
E&E NEWS (Jan. 3, 2022, 6:22 AM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/whatsahead-for-build-back-better-4-scenarios/; Andrea Shalal & Jarrett Renshaw,
How the White House Hopes to Save Biden’s Build Back Better Bill, REUTERS (Jan.
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in a lack of support, 103 forcing legislators to explore the
benefits of the piecemeal method. 104 President Biden himself
approved of an incremental approach, stating “I think we can
break the package up, get as much as we can now and come
back and fight for the rest.” 105 Though this process would be
much slower, parts of the whole have a greater chance of
success. 106
The overhaul approach initially used by Build Back
Better, has also been used in failed attempts to transform the
military’s approach to sexual violence. Over the last thirteen
years, Congress has introduced at least twenty bills
targeting the military’s policies and procedures on sexual
offenses. 107 Congress introduced six of these bills in 2019
18, 2022, 11:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/how-white-house-hopessave-bidens-spending-bill-2022-01-18/; Michael Collins & Joey Garrison, Free
Pre-K, Medicare Expansion: What Won’t Happen With Build Back Better Likely
Dead, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/12/19/joemanchin-build-back-better-explained/8960657002/ (Dec. 19, 2021, 4:41 PM).
103. Kelsey Snell & Barbara Sprunt, Democrats Are Struggling to Sell Biden’s
Agenda. It Isn’t the First Time, Either, NPR (Dec. 10, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/12/10/1062895561/democrats-struggles-to-sell-bidensagenda-mirror-past-messaging-woes.
104. Elaine Kamarck, Biden Can Still Salvage His Build Back Better Bill if He
Settles for a Piece by Piece Strategy, BROOKINGS (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.bro
okings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/12/21/biden-can-still-salvage-his-build-back-betterbill-if-he-settles-for-a-piece-by-piece-strategy/; Rosemary Becchi et al., Build
Back Better Act: Recent Developments and Takeaways, JDSUPRA (Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/build-back-better-act-recent-6661260/.
105. Victor Reklaitis, Biden Sees Build Back Better Package Broken Up to Get
Parts of It Passed, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 19, 2022, 4:49 PM), https://www.market
watch.com/story/biden-sees-build-back-better-package-broken-up-to-get-parts-of
-it-passed-2022-01-19; Alexandra Alper, Build Back Better Plan Could Pass in
Chunks, Biden Says, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2022, 7:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/world/us/biden-says-he-will-look-pass-build-back-better-elements-piecemeal-20
22-01-19/.
106. Becchi et al., supra note 104.
107. There have been at least twenty pieces of legislation solely dedicated to
implementing substantial changes to the military’s approach to sex-related
offenses introduced in either the House of Representatives or the Senate which
were never brought for a vote. H.R. 840, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 3647, 112th Cong.
(2012); S. 871, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2002, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 548, 113th
Cong. (2013); S. 964, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2227, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1092,
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alone. 108 Many were brought in response to the DoD’s Annual
Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, finding an
astronomical increase in the number of service members
becoming victims of sexual assault. 109 The report not only
elicited a response from the acting Secretary of Defense but
from enraged members of Congress seeking change. 110 In the
end, however, Congress never passed any of those six bills,
with most left buried in committee. 111
This pattern of legislative inaction has been going on
since at least 2009. The Military Domestic and Sexual
Violence Response Act, a 142-page piece of legislation
entirely devoted to overhauling the military’s approach to
113th Cong. (2013); S. 2870, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 5257, 114th Cong. (2016);
H.R. 3209, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1495, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 3015, 116th
Cong. (2019); S. 1500, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 7060, 116th Cong. (2020); S. 1526,
116th Cong. (2019): H.R. 3216, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 3148, 116th Cong.
(2019); H.R. 5738, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 3224, 117th Cong. (2021); S. 1611,
117th Cong. (2021).
108. See S. 1495, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 3015, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1500,
116th Cong. (2019); S. 1526, 116th Cong. (2019): H.R. 3216, 116th Cong. (2019);
H.R. 3148, 116th Cong. (2019).
109. 2018 DOD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55.
110. The shocking figures from the 2018 report led to then acting Secretary of
Defense Patrick Shanahan requesting a task force be formed, the Sexual Assault
Accountability and Investigation Task Force, to elicit suggestions on how to fix
the crisis within the military. See Memorandum from Patrick M. Shanahan,
Acting Sec’y of Def., on Establishment of the Sexual Assault Accountability and
Investigation Task Force (Mar. 27, 2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/16/
2002116965/-1/-1/1/Establishment-of-the-Sexual-Assault-and-InvestigationTask-Force.pdf; 2018 DOD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 5; David Vergun,
DOD Task Force Will Address Military Sexual Assaults, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Apr.
22, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1820678/dodtask-force-will-address-military-sexual-assaults/; Press Release, Sen. Kristen
Gillibrand, After Recent Department of Defense Report Highlights Its Continued
Failure to Address Crisis of Military Sexual Assault, Gillibrand Leads Bipartisan
Group of Senators to Reintroduce Military Justice Improvement Act and Calls on
Congress to Act (June 13, 2019), https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/news/press
/release/after-recent-department-of-defense-report-highlights-its-continued-failu
re-to-address-crisis-of-military-sexual-assault-gillibrand-leads-bipartisan-group
-of-senators-to-reintroduce-military-justice-improvement-act-and-calls-on-congr
ess-to-act.
111. When viewed on Congress.gov which tracks the legislative history of bills,
all six bills introduced in 2019 were left in committee where they died.
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sexual offenses, was introduced in the House in February
2009. 112 After being referred through a string of committees,
the bill was never brought up for a vote. 113 Fast forward
almost four years to November 2012, when the Military
Sexual Assault Prevention Act was introduced in the Senate,
read twice, and sent to the Committee on Armed Services—
where it died. 114 Or six months later in May 2013, when both
the House and the Senate simultaneously presented pieces
of legislation referred to as the Combating Military Sexual
Assault Act. Both were passed down through different
committees and subcommittees where they were never
brought for a vote and also died. 115 This pattern continues
today with the I Am Vanessa Guillén Act, currently sitting
in committee with no vote in sight. 116
However, even with each of these bills’ failures, change
within the military was quietly taking place. The 2022
112. Military Domestic and Sexual Violence Response Act, H.R. 840, 111th
Cong. (2009), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/840/act
ions?r=67&s=1 (introduced Feb. 3, 2009).
113. The committees included the House Armed Services, the House Judiciary,
the House Veterans’ Affairs, the Subcommittee on Health, the Subcommittee on
Military Personnel, and the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland
Security. Id.
114. Military Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 2012, S. 3647, 112th Cong.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/3647/all-actions (noting
on November 29, 2012, that the bill was read “twice and referred to the
Committee on Armed Services”).
115. Combating Military Sexual Assault Act of 2013, H.R. 2002, 113th Cong.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2002/committees?r=78&
s=1 (referred to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel on
June 20, 2013, with no further action taken); Combating Military Sexual Assault
Act of 2013, S. 871, 113th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress
/senate-bill/871/committees (referred to Senate Armed Services Committee with
hearing, but no further action taken).
116. See I Am Vanessa Guillén Act of 2020, H.R. 8270, 116th Cong.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/8270/committees?r=5&
s=1 (referred to House Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2020 with
no further action taken); I Am Vanessa Guillén Act of 2021, H.R. 3224, 117th
Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3224/committees
?r=2&s=1 (referred to House Armed Services Committee on May 13, 2021 with
no further action taken).
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NDAA provisions are only the newest addition in a long line
of past changes implemented using the piecemeal approach.
The National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years
2013 to 2021 included numerous provisions modifying the
military’s policies on sex-related crimes. 117 Although
117. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 §§ 578–79, Pub.
L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632, 1763–64 [hereinafter 2013 NDAA] (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 1561 note); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014
§§ 1702–03, 1705, Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 672, 954–58, 959–60 (2013)
[hereinafter 2014 NDAA] (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 832, 843 note, 856); Carl Levin
and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015 § 546, Pub. L. No. 113-291, 128 Stat. 3292, 3374–75 (2014) [hereinafter
2015 NDAA] (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1561 note); National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 § 538, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 129 Stat. 726, 817–818 (2015)
[hereinafter 2016 NDAA]; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 § 543, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2127 (2016) [hereinafter 2017
NDAA] (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1561 note); National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 § 707, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, 1436 (2017)
[hereinafter 2018 NDAA] (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1720D(a)(2)(A));
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 §§ 535–
36, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636, 1761 (2018) [hereinafter 2019 NDAA]
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1561 note, 673 note); National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2020 §§ 532, 538, 731, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198,
1359–61, 1363–64, 1457–60 (2019) [hereinafter 2020 NDAA] (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 837, 1044e note, 2733a); William M. (Mac) Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 § 525, 539, 539A, Pub.
L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388, 3600, 3606–08 (2021) [hereinafter 2021 NDAA]
(sec. 539 codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 7461 note; sec. 539A codified at 10
U.S.C. § 1561 note). Section 578 of the 2013 NDAA seeks to eliminate service
members who are believed to have been discharged or dismissed from the armed
forces in retaliation for filing a report related to a sexual offense. The provision
requires administrative review of any involuntary discharges within one-year of
an unrestricted report. Section 579 established a policy and plan for prevention
and response to sexual harassment. 2013 NDAA, § 578–579, 126 Stat. at 1763–
64; see 10 U.S.C. § 1561 note. Section 1702 of the 2014 NDAA eliminates
commanders’ (convening authorities) ability to modify sentences for serious
offenses by overturning a guilty verdict or reducing the finding of guilty to that
of a lesser included offense. Section 1703 of the 2014 NDAA also eliminates the
5-year statute of limitation for trial by court-martial for additional offenses
involving sex-related crimes, and section 1705 states that an individual who is
found guilty of an offense in violation of section 920(a) or (b) of the UCMJ (rape,
sexual assault of a child, forcible sodomy, or an attempt to commit these offenses)
must face the minimum punishment of dismissal or dishonorable discharge. 2014
NDAA, §§ 1702–03, 127 Stat. at 954–58, 959–60; see 10 U.S.C. §§ 832, 843 note,
856. Section 546 of the 2015 NDAA ordered the establishment of the Defense
Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual
Assault in the Armed Forces. The committee would be responsible for advising
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the Secretary of Defense on the investigation, prosecution, and defense of
allegations of rape, forcible sodomy, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct
involving members of the armed forces and would be required to submit an
annual report to describe the results of the activities of the Advisory Committee.
2015 NDAA, § 546, 128 Stat. at 3374–75; see 10 U.S.C. § 1561 note. Section 538
of the 2016 NDAA established improvements in the Department of Defense
Prevention and Response to Sexual Assaults to better understand the impact that
such assaults have on male victims. This provision included training specific to
the impact on male victims of sexual assault. 2016 NDAA, § 538, 129 Stat. at
817–818. Section 543 of the 2017 NDAA requires the inclusion in the Advisory
Committee’s annual report of information on complaints of retaliation in
connection with reports of sexual assault in the armed forces. 2017 NDAA, § 543,
130 Stat. at 2127; see 10 U.S.C. § 1561 note. Section 707 of the 2018 NDAA
expanded sexual trauma counseling and treatment to include not only members
serving on active duty but those also serving on active duty for training or
inactive duty for training (reserve members). 2018 NDAA, § 707, 131 Stat. at
1436; see 38 U.S.C. § 1720D(a)(2)(A). Sections 535 and 536 of the 2019 NDAA
created a uniform command action form for disposition of unrestricted reports of
sexual assault involving service members, and also instituted standardized
policies for the expedited transfer of victims in cases of sexual assault or domestic
violence. 2019 NDAA, §§ 535–36, 132 Stat. at 1761; se 10 U.S.C. §§ 1561 note,
673 note. Section 532 of the 2020 NDAA increases the protection of convictions of
sexual assault by outlining greater restrictions on what a commander cannot do,
including prohibiting a commanding officer from censuring, reprimanding, or
admonishing the court or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with
respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court. Section 537 of the 2020
NDAA requires that a service member who was the victim of an alleged sexual
assault at the hands of another service member to receive notifications of each
significant event in the military justice process that relates to the investigation,
prosecution, and confinement of the offender for such assault. Section 731 of the
2020 NDAA, for the first time since the Feres Doctrine was established, created
an exception which gives a service member, who suffer malpractice at a military
facility, the right to receive compensation from the military claims system. While
not related to sexual assault policies and practices, this creates the first opening
in the unbreakable wall that the Feres Doctrine has created for service members
who have suffered harm at the hands of the armed forces. 2020 NDAA, §§ 532,
538, 731, 133 Stat. at 1359–61, 1363–64, 1457–60; see 10 U.S.C. § 837, 1044e
note, 2733a. Section 525 of the 2021 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to
provide the Committees of Armed Services of both chambers with a report of the
number of former members of the armed forces who were discharged or dismissed
on or after September 21, 2011, who applied for review of such discharge or
dismissal and within that application for review, asserted there dismissal was
connected to a Department of Defense policy regarding sex-related offenses.
Section 539 and 539A of the 2021 NDAA creates a “Safe-to-Report” policy across
all branches of the armed forces, which allows a victim of sexual assault to report
the crime without fear of punishment for minor collateral offenses (i.e., underage
drinking or breaking curfew). 2021 NDAA, § 525, 539, 539A, 134 Stat. at 3600,
3606–08; see 10 U.S.C. § 7461 note; 10 U.S.C. § 1561 note; Press Release, Sen.
Kristen Gillibrand, Gillibrand Announces Final NDAA Will Include Safe to
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seemingly insignificant when viewed independently, each is
a building block from which something substantial may be
formed. These NDAA provisions often revive and implement
pieces of the dead legislation. For example, the Military
Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 2012 included a section
prohibiting service in the armed forces by an individual who
had been convicted of a sexual offense. 118 Although that
Senate bill died, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 resurrected the provision prohibiting any
individual convicted of a sexual offense from enlisting. 119
The 2022 NDAA and its predecessors successfully
transformed some of the military’s sexual offense policies.
These incremental changes have opened the door for
legislators in favor of reform to create and push for small
steps forward rather than massive bills unlikely to pass.
Small steps, while not necessarily the fastest way to solve
the military’s problems, can be used to build on the
provisions which already exist within past NDAAs. While
critics of this method may argue that it does not do
enough, 120 the piecemeal approach allowed the 2022 NDAA
Report and Key Amendments to Address Military Sexual Assault, (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/news/press/release/gillibrand-announces-final
-ndaa-will-include-safe-to-report-and-key-amendments-to-address-military-sex
ual-assault.
118. S. 3647, 112th Cong., § 2 (2012).
119. 2013 NDAA, § 523, 126 Stat. at 1723; see 10 U.S.C. § 504 note.
120. See Karoun Demirjian, Broad Overhaul of Military Justice System Being
Sidelined in Favor of Narrower Focus on Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Dec. 5,
2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/militarysexual-assault-reform/2021/12/04/5946b0cc-5455-11ec-9267-17ae3bde2f26_story
.html; Matthew Hay Brown, Military Sex Assault Critics Want Justice Overhaul,
BALT. SUN (Dec. 19, 2013, 9:09 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/bsmd-military-sexual-assault-chain-of-command-20131219-story.html; Leo Shane
III, Victim Advocates Want Radical Overhaul in Handling of Military Sex
Assaults, STRIPES (Dec. 29, 2011), https://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripescentral/stripes-central-1.8040/victim-advocates-want-radical-overhaul-in-handli
ng-of-military-sex-assaults-1.164733 [https://web.archive.org/web/2015092000
1929/https://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central-1.8040/victim
-advocates-want-radical-overhaul-in-handling-of-military-sex-assaults-1.1647
33]; John M. Donnelly, NDAA Envisions New Military Policies on Sexual
Assaults, ROLL CALL (Dec. 8, 2020, 11:13 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/12/
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provisions to fly under the radar and achieve what no other
military legislation has been able to—get sexual offenses out
of the hands of the chain of command.
B. Getting to the Root of the Military’s Sexual Violence
Crisis
Even in the wake of the 2022 NDAA’s procedural
success, the provisions themselves will likely fail to
transform the military’s approach to sexual offenses. The
military’s judicial system is plagued by the expansive
authority held by commanders. And even with some power
removed from the chain of command, the 2022 NDAA still
allows overall control to lie within the armed forces. This
system of self-regulation has failed time and time again,
often exacerbating the crisis rather than remedying the
problem.
1. Commander Discretion, a Plague on the Military
Judicial System
Commander discretion and the military’s self-regulation
is a byproduct of Congress’ enactment of the UCMJ. By
creating a separate statutory and adjudicatory system meant
only for the armed forces, Congress has left much of the
military judicial system within the control of individual
commanders. Commander discretion is one of the most
criticized aspects of the military’s approach to sexual
offenses, due in large part to concerns over fundamental
fairness and justice. 121 This Section explores the concept of
08/ndaa-envisions-new-military-policies-on-sexual-assaults/.
121. Even though Article 37 of the UCMJ prohibits commanders from using
their rank and position to unduly influence the course of a trial—referred to as
unlawful command influence—concerns about impartiality and independence are
frequently raised. Commanders have been accused of tainting military juries and
interfering with witness testimony. See Dan Maurer, The ‘Shadow Report’ on
Commanders’ Prosecutorial Powers Raises More Questions Than Answers,
LAWFARE (May 11, 2020, 11:07 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/shadow-reportcommanders-prosecutorial-powers-raises-more-questions-answers; KRISTY N.
KAMARCK & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., MILITARY SEXUAL
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commander discretion, the issues it raises, and its
detrimental impact on the military’s sexual violence crisis.
Commander discretion is intricately connected to every
aspect and step of the military judicial process. While a
completed investigation for sexual assault or harassment is
reviewed for legal sufficiency by a military lawyer, or Staff
Judge Advocate, they lack authority to bring forward any
form of judicial, non-judicial, or administrative disciplinary
action. 122 The Staff Judge Advocate can only recommend
appropriate discipline, but the ultimate decision resides with
the commander with court-martial convening authority. 123
After receiving the Staff Judge Advocate’s legal advice, the
commander may exercise authority over the matter, dismiss
the allegations with no further action, or refer the matter to
the next officer within the chain of command. 124
In analyzing how an incident should proceed,
commanders must evaluate the “interests of justice and good
ASSAULT: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 59–60 (2021)
[hereinafter MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT: A FRAMEWORK]; Monu Bedi, Unraveling
Unlawful Command Influence, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1401, 1401–02, 1417–20
(2016).
122. MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 121, at 60; see 10
U.S.C. § 815 (stating that the commander has the authority to subject a service
member in their command to non-judicial punishment); 10 U.S.C. § 822 (stating
that the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the
commanding officer of the particular armed force branch are the only individuals
who can convene a general court-martial); 10 U.S.C. § 818 (stating that only
general court martials have jurisdiction over § 920(a)–(b), rape and sexual
assault).
123. General-court martial convening authority refers to any individual who
has the power to initiate a general court-martial. A general-court martial may be
convened by the commanding officer of a unified or specified combatant
command, the commanding officer of an Army Group, Corps, division, separate
brigade, or a corresponding unit of the Army or Marine Corps; or any other
commanding officer designated by the Secretary concerned. MILITARY SEXUAL
ASSAULT: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 121, at 60; U.S. Military Rank Insignia:
Officer Insignia, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Resources/Insignia/
#officer-insignia (last visited May 28, 2022) (listing the different levels of rank
for officers in the military, a colonel falls under the O-6 rank); MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES r. 401, at II-35–36 (2019); 10 U.S.C. § 834.
124. MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 121, at 60.
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order and discipline.” 125 Such an evaluation requires the
commander to look at a number of factors: whether the
offense occurred in wartime; the effect of the offense on the
morale, health, safety, welfare, and good order and discipline
of the command; the nature, seriousness, and circumstances
of the offense and the accused’s culpability in connection with
the offense; the accused’s willingness to cooperate in the
investigation or prosecution of others; and the impact and
appropriateness of alternative disposition options—
including nonjudicial punishment or administrative action—
with respect to the accused’s potential for continued service
and the responsibilities of the command. 126 Notably, these
factors fail to deal directly with the well-being and protection
of the victim, and instead revolve around the continued
functioning, health and welfare of the military institution.
This leaves victims in an environment where they are aware
that they are not the priority, and that their commander
holds all of the power.
Even with the new NDAA provisions, concerns still
remain over commander discretion. While section 543
implements an independent investigator for formal
complaints of sexual harassment, the provision itself fails to
define what “independent” actually means. 127 Although
currently viewed as someone outside of the chain of
command, without a codified definition, the best clarification
exists only in the form of a military memo stating the
investigator must be outside the victim’s brigade. 128 The lack
of an enforceable legal definition leaves the door open for the
memo definition to be disregarded, or the potential for the
125. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES app. 2.1, at A2.1-2 (2019).
126. Id.
127. Nowhere within section 543 or any of the other NDAA section that refer
to the new office, standalone offense, or sexual harassment investigative
procedures does it define who is an “independent” investigator. See 2022 NDAA,
§§ 531, 532, 539D, 543, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541, 1692–96, 1699–1700,
1709–10 (2021) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 824a, 1044f, 934 note, 1561).
128. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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military to revert back to its previous policy out of comfort
and ease. Additionally, the NDAA’s creation of a standalone
offense for sexual harassment will still fall within
commander control. Charged under Article 134, the crime of
sexual harassment is not specifically listed as a “covered
offense,” and thus falls outside of the Special Trial Counsel’s
authority. 129 This allows commanders to maintain authority
over charging and adjudicating sexual harassment.
Concerns over commander discretion also plague the
reporting process. Following their disclosure, victims fear
retaliation, professional reprimands, and a lack of
confidentiality. 130 Military victims have stated that after
reporting an incident of sexual assault or harassment they
began to receive reprimands for minor infractions such as
falling behind on a run or underage drinking. 131 These
reprimands impact the service members career to such a
degree that one Petty Officer stated, “I knew when I reported
my career would be over.” 132 Victims also reported hearing
their commanders talk openly about their cases to others or
seeing their case referenced in an email copied to people who
should not have been privy to the information. 133 Despite
129. The special trial counsel has authority to determine whether to charge an
individual with a covered offense and whether to initiate a court-martial for
covered offenses. Covered offenses include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
assault, stalking, retaliation, rape, sexual assault, other sexual misconduct, child
pornography, and any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any covered
offense. 2022 NDAA, §§ 531, 533, 135 Stat. at 1692–94, 1695–96; see 10 U.S.C.
§§ 824a, 801.
130. Embattled: Retaliation Against Sexual Assault Survivors in the US
Military, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 18, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/
18/embattled/retaliation-against-sexual-assault-survivors-us-military
[hereinafter Embattled].
131. David L. Hudson, Jr., Chilling Effect Overview, FIRE (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.thefire.org/chilling-effect/; Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 BOS. U. L. REV. 685, 685
(1978) (discussing the concept of the chilling effect as being “recognized most
frequently and articulated most clearly in decisions chiefly concerned with the
procedural aspects of free speech adjudication”); Embattled, supra note 130.
132. Embattled, supra note 130.
133. Id.
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regulations which allow a Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator to withhold information that could reasonably
lead to personal identification of the victim, advocates report
that in practice, in smaller units, it is too easy to figure out
who the victim is. 134
The 2022 NDAA provisions will not be able to assuage
these concerns. Though outside the chain of command, each
position created by the provisions is still held by an activeduty service member. As a foundational American institution
with roots deeply dug into the country’s past, present, and
future, preservation of the military is of the utmost
importance. Each service member is but one piece of the
whole, with their first priority being the survival of the
institution. Removing investigatory, prosecutorial, and
adjudicatory authority out of the chain of command but still
keeping the authority within the military fails to
acknowledge this duty and its potential to bias one’s
decision-making process. History has shown that selfregulation breeds institutional self-preservation, in the end
forcing a choice between institution and individual.
2. The Failed History of Institutional Self-Regulation
The creation of an independent office and investigator
still within and involving those immersed in an institution’s
cultures and mores is insufficient to truly eradicate sexual
misconduct within the military. Service members dedicate
their lives to the institution they serve. 135 The dedication and
commitment to that institution is all consuming, and the
survival of the institution means the survival of the
individual. Mottos of the branches of the armed forces
include “Non sibi sed patriae,” which is Latin for “Not self,
but country,” and “Semper Fidelis,” which embodies the
Marine Corps’ eternal commitment to both their fellow

134. Id.
135. Lynn K. Hall, The Importance of Understanding Military Culture, 50 SOC.
WORK HEALTH CARE 4, 12, 15 (2011).
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Marines and the United States. 136 The movie A Few Good
Men references “the code” and the motto “Unit, Core, God,
Country.” 137 While the movie is a fictional portrayal of
military life, the phrase speaks to the lifelong commitment
that soldiers make to their unit. Members of the armed forces
are so enmeshed and attached to the institution itself that
bias is inevitable, whether conscious or not. It may be that
only a complete severing from the institution itself will be
enough to end the sexual violence.
Self-preservation and the failure of self-regulation is by
no means unique to the military alone. In today’s society,
government, religion, and education are three pillars of
American life. And each of these culturally and socially
engrained institutions share the same sexual violence crisis
and the same failure to act. In the Catholic Church, the
system for reporting and investigating sex-related offenses is
similar in many ways to the military’s procedures. Through
canonical law, the Church, like the armed forces, adopts its
own institutional regulations, 138 binding on all Roman
Catholics. 139 Canon law labels sexual abuse of a minor to be
a grave crime, just as the UCMJ considers sexual assault a
serious offense. 140 Yet even with strictly defined laws, both
136. What Are the Mottos of the 6 Branches of the Military?, USO (Feb. 10,
2021), https://www.uso.org/stories/2990-what-are-the-mottos-of-the-6-branchesof-the-u-s-military; Marine Corps Values, MARINES, https://www.marines.com/life
-as-a-marine/standards/values.html (last visited May 28, 2022).
137. A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Ent. 1992).
138. Canon Law, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS, https://www.usccb.org/beliefsand-teachings/what-we-believe/canon-law (last visited May 28, 2022).
139. John J. Coughlin, Canon Law and the Clergy Sex Abuse Crisis: The
Failure of the Rule of Law (Notre Dame L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 09-21,
2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1397584.
140. John J. Coughlin, The Clergy Sexual Abuse Crisis and the Spirit of Canon
Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 977, 980 (2003) (“Canon 1395 of the 1983 Codex Iuris
Canonici (the ‘1983 Code’) establishes that sexual contact with a minor qualifies
as one of four classifications of sexual offenses for which a man may be
permanently removed from the clerical state.”). Under the UCMJ, sexual assault
or rape can be charged under Article 120. 10 U.S.C. § 920. Sexual assault or rape
can result in a punishment of life imprisonment or even death. See 10 U.S.C.
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institutions rarely turn to their harshest judicial options. 141
Reported child abuse at the hands of Catholic priests
began in the 1950s, 142 though the pervasive extent of abuse
was unknown until early 2002. 143 In priest sexual abuse
cases, victims commonly report abuse to another priest or
cleric. 144 Often times that cleric passes the report up the
chain to the head of the specific church, a bishop or
archbishop, or even a cardinal. 145 In some cases, Church
§ 843; 10 U.S.C.§ 856.
141. In Fiscal Year 2019, 5,699 unrestricted reports of sexual assault were
filed, of those 3,716 had completed dispositions meaning the offender could
receive possible disciplinary action, of those it was determined that 1,630 cases
warranted discipline, of those 795 were brought to a court martial, and of those
only 264 resulted in a conviction of at least one charge at court-martial. DEP’T
DEF. ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MIL., app. B, 7, 17, 20–21 (2019); Andrew
Tilghman, Military Sexual Assault Claims: 1 in 20 Lead to Jail Time, MIL. TIMES
(May 13, 2015), https://www.militarytimes.com/2015/05/13/military-sexualassault-claims-1-in-20-lead-to-jail-time/; Coughlin, supra note 140, at 981–82 (“I
am unaware of a single case in the United States during the past several decades
in which a priest was dismissed from the clerical state as a result of the diocesan
penal process stipulated in canon law.”).
142. Catholic Church Child Sexual Abuse Scandal, BBC (Oct. 5, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44209971. In 1985, Louisiana Priest Gilbert J.
Gauthe was convicted of molesting at least thirty-nine children between 1972 and
1983, and in the late 1990s reports of widespread sexual abuse began to come out
of Ireland. Tara Isabella Burton, The Decades-Long Catholic Priest Child Sex
Abuse Crisis, Explained, VOX (Sept. 4, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/
2018/9/4/17767744/catholic-child-clerical-sex-abuse-priest-pope-francis-crisisexplained; Factbox: Reports into Abuses in the Irish Catholic Church, REUTERS
(Jan. 12, 2021, 7:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ireland-churchabuses-factbox/factbox-reports-into-abuses-in-the-irish-catholic-church-idUSKB
N29H1JJ.
143. The Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal unraveled in 2002, when the
Boston Globe released its first of dozens of stories revealing the widespread
sexual abuse by priests in and around Boston. Michael Rezendez et al., Church
Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6, 2002, 5:50 PM), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-abuse-pr
iest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html; Thomas Farragher,
Church Cloaked in Culture of Silence, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 24, 2002), https://www.
bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/02/24/church-cloaked-culturesilence/88cLKuodvSiHjvg0dfz24L/story.html.
144. Burton, supra note 142; Rezendez et al., supra note 143; Farragher, supra
note 143.
145. Burton, supra note 142; Rezendez et al., supra note 143; Farragher, supra
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leaders are even aware of previous instances of abuse
reported against the same cleric. 146 Accusations of sexual
abuse seldom result in removal from the clerical state, even
though Canon law renders it the proper punishment. 147
Instead, the priest is placed on “sick leave” and ordered to
receive psychiatric treatment. 148 In many instances,
however, the priest is merely reassigned to another parish
with unsuspecting families and children. 149 Even when the
church provides a settlement, it demands the victim’s secrecy
about the abuse. 150
Though the Church provides excuses for the conduct of
its clerics, 151 the truth is far more simple. 152 The Church’s
response to abuse has long been plagued by self-preservation
to the detriment of child protection. 153 The Church’s culture
reflects a long-standing rigid adherence to Canon law
principles which have the effect of prioritizing offending
clergy over all others. 154 The Church imposed “pontifical
note 143.
146. Burton, supra note 142; Rezendez et al., supra note 143; Farragher, supra
note 143.
147. See supra note 139–140 and accompanying text; Associated Press, Vatican
Reveals How Many Priests Defrocked for Sex Abuse Since 2004, CBS NEWS (May
7, 2014, 10:14 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/vatican-reveals-how-manypriests-defrocked-for-sex-abuse-since-2004/.
148. Rezendez et al., supra note 143; Burton, supra note 142.
149. Burton, supra note 142.
150. Rezendez et al., supra note 143.
151. Rezendez et al., supra note 143 (“The church’s likely legal defense . . . will
be that doctors deemed Geoghan rehabilitated. . . . In 1984, there were still some
clinicians who believed child molesters could be cured. But other specialists had
long since warned Catholic bishops of the high risk that priests who had abused
children would become repeat offenders.”).
152. Peter Stanford, The Catholic Church Is Still Making Excuses for
Pedophilia, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2019/feb/17/catholic-church-still-making-excuses-paedophilia-pope.
153. Tony Foley, Changing Institutional Culture in the Wake of Clerical Abuse
– The Essentials of Restorative and Legal Regulation, 22 CONTEMP. JUST. REV.
171, 173 (2019).
154. Id. at 175.
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secrecy” on its investigations of abuse and forbade clerics
from reporting to police or civil authorities. 155 Even by July
2020—decades after learning of the scale of abuse—the
Church still refuses to acknowledge any legal obligation to
report allegations to police or civil authorities. 156
Under Canon law, the Church is responsible for
conducting the investigation into any allegations of sexual
abuse. 157 Once a bishop or superior receives an allegation
against one of his priests, he is supposed to conduct a
preliminary investigation. If the claim has a “semblance of
truth” he sends the case to the Vatican to the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith for review. 158 The Congregation
staff consists of seventeen Canon lawyers who process the
cases. 159 The Congregation typically sends the case back to
the bishop to investigate the allegation fully, either through

155. Id.
156. In July 2020, the Church released a document, the Vademecum, which
states that even in cases where there is no explicit legal obligation to do so, the
ecclesiastical authorities should make a report to competent civil authorities.
However, the Vademecum does not promulgate a new law, and is being described
instead as an “instruction manual,” with most of its language frequently using
words such as “should” rather than “must.” David Welna, New Vatican Guidance
Urges Clergy to Report Cases of Sexual Abuse, NPR (July 16, 2020, 4:24 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/16/891977309/vatican-urges-reporting-of-sexual-ab
use-in-new-how-to-handbook-for-clergy. There is also concern at the lack of
transparency by priests due to the clergy privilege that exists in the United
States. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have some form of privilege
protecting clerics from disclosing statements, which often includes statements
relaying instances of abuse. Christine P. Bartholomew, Exorcising the Clergy
Privilege, 103 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1020–21, 1054–55 (2017). Though this privilege
is rarely successfully asserted, it provides an added avenue for protection of the
institution by those who are beholden to it. See id. at 1054–55.
157. Canon Law Guides Church’s Response to Clergy Sexual Abuse,
ARCHDIOCESE OF BALT. (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.archbalt.org/canon-lawguides-churchs-response-to-clergy-sexual-abuse/; Nicole Winfield, Vatican’s
Legal Procedures for Handling Sex Abuse, Explained, AP (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/826b0d5ec24340cd866993fa150ce38b.
158. Winfield, supra note 157; Stacy Meichtry, Vatican Scrambles to Clarify
Policy on Abuse Claims, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303828304575179421838222464.
159. Winfield, supra note 157.
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a full canonical trial or via an expedited administrative
process. 160 The Congregation has the authority to instruct
the bishop to prosecute the alleged abuser in a local tribunal,
where the Congregation serves as an appellate court before
a potential defrocking—removal from the priesthood—is
carried out. 161 The Congregation is also empowered to
dispense with a Church trial and refer a case directly to the
Pope for defrocking when the evidence is overwhelming. 162
While the Congregation is an independent investigatory
and adjudicatory unit with no direct authority over the
offenders, cleric sexual abuse cases are still cropping up all
over the world. 163 The Church’s sexual offense procedures
closely parallel the changes implemented by the 2022 NDAA.
Both include independent but internal institutional offices
for investigating and prosecuting sexual offenses. Both
include a male-dominated hierarchy, with clear superiors. 164
160. Winfield, supra note 157; Meichtry, supra note 158.
161. Meichtry, supra note 158.
162. Winfield, supra note 157; Meichtry, supra note 158.
163. Jay Tokasz, Buffalo Diocese Hit with 900 Abuse Claims in Bankruptcy
Court, More Than Any Diocese, BUFF. NEWS (Aug. 16, 2021), https://buffalonews
.com/news/local/buffalo-diocese-hit-with-900-abuse-claims-in-bankruptcy-courtmore-than-any-diocese/article_e31cc530-feaa-11eb-9703-ebc280569a5c.html;
Aurelien Breeden, Over 200,000 Minors Abused by Clergy in France Since 1950,
Report Estimates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10
/05/world/europe/france-catholic-church-abuse.html; Associated Press, A New
Jersey Catholic Diocese Agrees to Pay $87.5M to Settle Sex Abuse Lawsuits, NPR
(Apr. 20, 2022, 11:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/2022/04/20/1093740385/catholicchurch-new-jersey-sex-abuse-settlement; Catholic Church in Spain Faces Major
Abuse Investigation – El Pais Newspaper, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2021, 8:45 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/catholic-church-spain-faces-major-abuseinvestigation-el-pais-newspaper-2021-12-19/; Claire Giangravé, Time’s Up For
Catholic Church in Italy to Reckon with Clerical Abuse, Survivor Group Says,
RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Feb. 22, 2022), https://religionnews.com/2022/02/22/timesup-for-catholic-church-in-italy-to-reckon-with-clerical-abuse-survivor-groupsays/.
164. Women make up between 20 to 29 percent of the active duty officers in
each branch of the military, except for the Marine Corps where they make up
around 9 percent. Gender Distribution of Active Duty Officers in the U.S.
Department of Defense in 2020, by Service Branch, STATISTA, https://www.sta
tista.com/statistics/232608/gender-of-us-dod-officers-in-2010-by-service-branch/
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And each involves individuals who dedicate their lives to the
institutions they serve. 165 They are not viewed as a
profession but as a way of life.
Institutions of higher education also engage in internal
investigatory and adjudicatory processes that aid in the
cover-up of sex-related crimes, as well as the same
commitment to institutional self-preservation. When a
student conveys an instance of sexual assault to an
administrator, their first job and duty, just as Catholic
priests and service members, is to protect the institution—
not the student—from harm. 166 For decades many colleges
have chosen to handle most sexual crime allegations on
campuses themselves rather than reporting them to local
police. 167 Such actions often lead to college students believing
that university officials and campus security officers are
more interested in protecting the university’s reputation
than in helping police and prosecutors aggressively pursue
allegations of sexual assault.
A 2019 Association of American University survey on
sexual assault and misconduct polled over 150,000 students
at twenty-seven universities. 168 Data revealed a 13 percent
(last visited May 28, 2022). In 2019, there were approximately 31,350 Catholic
nuns, compared to 35,513 priests. Hollie McKay, Keeping the Sisterhood from
Extinction: The Struggle to Save Nuns in America, FOX NEWS (Jan. 27, 2020,
10:56 AM), https://www.foxnews.com/us/keeping-the-sisterhood-from-extinctionthe-struggle-to-save-nuns-in-america; Frequently Requested Church Statistics,
CTR. FOR APPLIED RSCH. IN THE APOSTOLATE, https://cara.georgetown.edu/
frequently-requested-church-statistics/ (last visited May 28, 2022). While not
necessarily an extreme difference, women are unable to hold positions of
authority within the church such as a bishop, cardinal, or the Pope. Tia Ghose,
Why Can’t a Woman Be Pope?, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.livescience.
com/27751-why-women-cant-be-pope.html.
165. How to Become a Priest, BRESCIA UNIV. (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.bres
cia.edu/2013/09/how-to-become-a-priest/; Hall, supra note 135, at 12, 15.
166. THE HUNTING GROUND (Weinstein Co. 2015).
167. Editorial Board, Campus Rape? Call the Police., CHI. TRIB. (July 16, 2017,
9:32 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-campusdevos-sexual-assault-0716-jm-20170714-story.html.
168. Understanding Sexual Assault on College Campuses, BEST COLLS.,
https://www.bestcolleges.com/resources/sexual-assault-on-campus/ (last visited
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nonconsensual sexual conduct rate. 169 Statistics provided by
the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network also indicated
that male college students between ages eighteen to twentyfour are five times more likely to experience sexual violence
than non-students. 170 Even with these high numbers of
sexual crimes, colleges and universities do not accurately
report what is happening on their campuses. 171 In 2016, 89
percent of the approximately 11,000 college and university
campuses that participate in federal financial aid programs
reported zero instances of rape that year. 172 Similar to both
the military and the Church, the reasons behind these low
report numbers have to do with the processes that are in
place to deal with sex-related crimes and the overwhelming
commitment to keep the institution’s image intact.
Under Title IX, colleges and universities are required to
address cases of sexual violence as to not discriminate
against women even if law enforcement will not. 173 Although
the law requires colleges and universities investigate and
manage these cases, how to do so is left largely up to the
institutions themselves. 174 Many institutions follow similar
policies and procedures which give the victim the right to an
May 28, 2022).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Colleges and universities which participate in federal financial aid
programs are required to report campus crime statistics and security information
under the federal Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and
Campus Crime Statistics Act (the “Clery Act”). Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f).
172. An Underreported Problem: Campus Sexual Misconduct, AAUW,
https://www.aauw.org/resources/article/underreported-sexual-misconduct/ (last
visited May 28, 2022); Schools Are Still Underreporting Sexual Harassment and
Assault, AAUW (Nov. 2, 2018), https://ww3.aauw.org/article/schools-still-under
reporting-sexual-harassment-and-assault/.
173. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); Vice: Evolution of a Plague & Campus Coverup (Home
Box Off. broadcast June 5, 2015); Know Your Rights at School: Sexual Assault &
Sexual Harassment, EQUAL RTS. ADVOCS., https://www.equalrights.org/issue/
equality-in-schools-universities/sexual-harassment/ (last visited May 28, 2022).
174. Vice: Evolution of a Plague & Campus Coverup (Home Box Off. broadcast
June 5, 2015).
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investigation, and if the investigation shows there is
sufficient evidence to support the complaint, a hearing is
required. 175 However, the hearing stage is often referred to
as a “kangaroo court,” where adjudicators can be a panel of
students, professors, or outside investigators. 176 Frequently
panelists will ask inappropriate questions, make up policies
and procedures on the spot, and blame the victim rather than
the accused. 177 Often times even within the investigation
stage the person who made the report is more harshly
scrutinized than the alleged abuser. 178 As for punishments
that are rendered when an individual is found guilty of
sexual assault, rape, or sexual misconduct on a college or
university campus, the reprimand is just as minimal as cases
involving service members and priests. 179 Students are more
likely to get expelled for cheating or other honor code
violations than for a sex-related crime. Even worse, schools
often defer such expulsions until after graduation so as to
have no real impact on abusers. 180 All of these issues result
175. Id.
176. Id. at 19:25 (statement of Laura Dunn).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Punishments for service members can range but often include the
lowering of rank, being moved to a different base, a decrease in pay, fine, or letter
of reprimand. Priests found guilty of sexual abuse can be placed on “sick leave”
and must receive psychiatric treatment or are just moved to another parish. See
supra notes 19–20, 50–51, 72, 140–141, 147–150 and accompanying text.
180. In one case at the University of Arkansas, the student was found guilty of
sexual misconduct and ordered expelled immediately. However, after an appeal,
the expulsion date was moved until after the student’s graduation. The victim’s
advocate demanded a harsher punishment which the school refused to do. It was
not until a news outlet in the area inquired about the case that the school
reinstated the initial punishment of immediate expulsion, claiming the change to
a delayed expulsion was an internal error. Vice: Evolution of a Plague & Campus
Coverup (Home Box Off. broadcast June 5, 2015). The data of actual reports
versus expulsions is staggering. From 2009 to 2013, Harvard had 135 reports of
sexual assault which resulted in ten expulsions. From 1996 to 2013, Stanford had
250 reports of sexual assault with one expulsion, and from 1998 to 2013, the
University of Virginia had 205 reports of sexual assault and zero expulsion.
However, within that time frame, 183 students were expelled for cheating and
other honor board violations. See THE HUNTING GROUND (Weinstein Co. 2015).
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in a process that frequently fails to deliver justice for the
victims. 181
The root cause of the failure to punish or even report is
largely because the schools do not want these cases coming
to light. 182 Schools cover up or neglect to report cases of
sexual violence because the criminal statistics that follow
such reporting would likely result in negative publicity,
fewer student applications, and ultimately less money for the
institution. 183 Parents do not want to send their seventeenor eighteen-year-old child to a campus with rampant sexual
violence. 184 Administrators are protecting a brand and
product they are selling, and are more concerned with their
lawyer’s advice, or their insurer’s recommendation, or the
guidance of their public relations specialist than the danger
to the victims. 185 Schools would rather cover up rape or
sexual assault then endure the bad press, or be known as a
rape school, which would hurt admissions and the
institutions reputation. 186 Self-preservation is of the utmost
importance.
“Any time you have an institutional bias where it prefers
to protect the institution over the individual that’s when
justice is not possible.” 187 Though the 2022 NDAA provisions
remove control from the chain of command, history shows us
181. Vice: Evolution of a Plague & Campus Coverup (Home Box Off. broadcast
June 5, 2015).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. In an episode of Vice the Emmy-awarding winning documentary series,
New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand stated that she thinks “there are many
cases where a school would rather cover up rape or sexual assault then endure
the bad press—then have to be known as a rape school. It obviously would hurt
admissions; it would hurt their reputation. And anytime you have an
institutional bias where it prefers to protect the institution over the individual
that’s when justice is not possible.” Id. at 22:30–22:50.
187. Vice: Evolution of a Plague & Campus Coverup at 22:43 (Home Box Off.
broadcast June 5, 2015) (statement of Sen. Kristen Gillibrand).
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that is not enough. The sexual violence crises across these
three institutions prove that self-regulation does not work.
The military, Catholic Church, and institutions of higher
education
all
allow
internal
investigations
and
adjudications, and all involve individuals who have
committed themselves and their lives to the institution. This
commitment instills a duty to protect the institution and
ensure its survival. Through this duty an implicit bias is
born, one which leads to victim-blaming, inadequate
punishment, and a lack of justice for victims. The only way
to effectively end sexual violence within these institutions is
to take judicial control away from them entirely.
III. THE REMEDY TO ERADICATE MILITARY SEXUAL VIOLENCE
The 2022 NDAA took the most politically realistic
approach to passage by utilizing a piecemeal method.
Though it provided an opportunity to alter the military’s
approach to sexual offenses, it failed to take full advantage
of this chance and fell short of implementing measures that
will truly spark change. It is evident that with an institution
whose history and roots lie deep within American culture,
there is no one solution that can remedy the decades long
issue of sexual violence in the military. There are a number
of incremental changes that can be made to put the military
on a better path forward. However, if eradication of sexual
violence is the goal, one change—taking the military out of
the equation altogether—would be the most transformative
measure in the military’s long history.
The existence of the military judicial system was never
one intended by the Framers. 188 The creation of a military
tribunal is merely implied in the Fifth Amendment’s Grand
Jury Clause rendering a grand jury indictment unnecessary

188. See Michel Paradis, Is a Major Change to Military Justice in the Works?,
LAWFARE (May 4, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/major-changemilitary-justice-works.
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when “in actual service in time of War or public danger.” 189
The Supreme Court eventually upheld the constitutionality
of military tribunals on the strength of Congress’s power “to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces.” 190 Though the United States still
separates the military and civilian judicial systems,
substantial precedent exists across the globe for removing
adjudicatory authority not only out of the chain of command,
but out of the armed forces entirely.
The United Kingdom currently has a system which
parallels the one implemented by the 2022 NDAA. Prior to
2006, crimes of murder, manslaughter, and rape in the UK
committed by service personnel were automatically heard in
civilian court. 191 In 2009, the UK created a Court Martial as
a permanent standing court for military matters. 192 “The
Royal Military Police with its Royal Navy and Royal Air
Force counterparts, known collectively as the Service Police,
investigate criminal offenses, including allegations of sexual
assault within the [UK] military.” 193 “The Service Police’s
role is investigative, and they operate independently of the
chain of command and the Ministry of Defence.” 194 When the
Service Police “determine there is enough evidence to charge
the suspect with a Schedule 2 offense,” 195 “the case must be
referred to the DSP [(Director of Service Prosecutions)]
189. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; see also Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
65, 71 (1858).
191. DEFENCE SELECT COMM., PROTECTING THOSE WHO PROTECT US: WOMEN IN
ARMED FORCES FROM RECRUITMENT TO CIVILIAN LIFE ¶ 156 (2021), https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmdfence/154/15402.htm.

THE

192. See L. LIBR. OF CONG., MILITARY JUSTICE: ADJUDICATION OF SEXUAL
OFFENSES 55 (2013) [hereinafter Adjudication of Sexual Offenses], https://tile.loc.
gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2013404869/2013404869.pdf.
193. Id. at 62 (footnote omitted).
194. Id.
195. A Schedule 2 offense includes rape and assault by penetration but does
not include other sexual offenses including sexual assault, exposure, or
voyeurism. Id. at 63.
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. . . .” 196 This effectively removes a commander’s authority.
The DSP is outside of the chain of command, is appointed by
the Queen, and may even be a civilian lawyer. 197 The DSP
has the authority to charge an offender and convene a courtmartial. 198
Even with this system in place, however, the United
Kingdom’s sexual violence problem is still at crisis levels. 199
Removing control out of the chain of command has failed to
such a degree that in December 2021 the House of Commons
debated a bill which would have reevaluated the military’s
judicial control over sexual offenses, potentially moving them
back into the civilian system. 200 The UK system provides a
196. Id.
197. Id. at 58.
198. Id. at 63–64.
199. See DEFENCE SELECT COMM., supra note 191, ¶¶ 38–40 (“The [UK] Army’s
Sexual Harassment survey of 2018 (the latest available data) recorded that 8%
of servicemen and 21% servicewomen had either experienced or witnessed sexual
harassment at work in the previous 12 months. Servicewomen were more likely
to report personally experiencing most types of ‘targeted’ sexual behaviour,
including unwelcome comments about their appearance, body or sexual activities
(34% of women versus 21% men), being touched in a way that made them
uncomfortable (13% versus 3%), being sexually touched without consent (7%
versus 3%), sexual assault (2% versus 1%) and rape (1% versus 0%).The Royal
Navy/Marines survey of 2015 (latest available) also indicated Naval
servicewomen were more likely to have experienced most types of targeted sexual
behaviours. For criminal sexual offences, women were a majority (137, or 76%) of
the 180 victims within the 161 investigations dealt with wholly by the Service
Justice System in 2020.”); see also Isobel Thompson, Should the UK Military Be
Removed from Handling Sexual Violence Cases?, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 4,
2021, 10:33 AM), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/uk-military-sexualviolence/.
200. See DEFENCE SELECT COMM., supra note 191, ¶¶ 155, 160–61 (“The
Government’s Armed Forces Bill 2021 does not directly implement the
recommendations to move these sexual offences, domestic violence and child
abuse outside the Service Justice System (SJS), if perpetrated in the UK. Instead
the Government is introducing ‘clearer guidance for prosecutors’ on how serious
crimes should be handled, with a Duty on the Director of Service Prosecutions
and the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and Wales to agree to a
protocol on where cases will be heard if there is concurrent jurisdiction. If the
prosecutors are unable to resolve a dispute over where a case should be heard,
the civilian prosecutors will ‘have the final say.”); see also Thompson, supra note
199.
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cautionary tale through which the 2022 NDAA provisions
can and should be viewed.
Though the UK system and 2022 NDAA only remove
control out of the chain of command, other countries have
taken it even further. Since the Second World War, German
civilian courts control military justice. 201 In 1956, the debate
as to whether Germany should reinstitute military courts
was addressed, and it was decided that soldiers had to be
treated as ordinary citizens in criminal prosecutions and
trials. 202 “All criminal offenses perpetrated by [German]
soldiers are adjudicated by the courts of ordinary
jurisdiction, and the ordinary rules for jurisdiction and venue
apply.” 203
Germany is not alone in its approach. 204 While not
entirely controlled by civilian courts, French military
personnel who commit a felony or misdemeanor during peace
time are adjudicated through the civilian system. 205 French
civilians and military personnel are treated as equals under
the law and are subject to the same investigative and
preliminary hearing procedural rules. Thus, the majority of
military criminal matters are addressed by civilian courts. 206
There is only one special military court in Paris which is
competent only to try transgressions committed abroad by
members of the armed forces. 207 Only in times of war do

201. Adjudication of Sexual Offenses, supra note 192, at 37.
202. Id.; Military Justice in Germany, GERMAN CULTURE, https://german
culture.com.ua/germany-facts/military-justice-in-germany/ (last visited May 28,
2022).
203. Adjudication of Sexual Offenses, supra note 192, at 40.
204. EDITH PALMER, L. LIBR. OF CONG., FRANCE: MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 6
(2013), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2018298762/20182987
62.pdf.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Jörg Gerkrath, Military Law in France, in EUROPEAN MILITARY LAW
SYSTEMS 275, 324–25 (Georg Nolte ed., 2003), https://core.ac.uk/download
/pdf/11860081.pdf.
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civilian courts lose jurisdiction over matters involving
military personnel. 208
Other countries have followed Germany and France’s
lead by removing adjudicatory authority out of the armed
forces and into the hands of civilian courts. 209 Whether
completely severing control for all charges, only charges of
sexual misconduct, or only in times of peace, each of these
countries establishes that the civilianization of the military
judicial system is possible.
While some support removing adjudication of sexual
assault out of the military entirely or at least out of the chain
of command, 210 there has also been significant pushback for
208. Id.; PALMER, supra note 204.
209. Countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Slovenia, Estonia,
Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Portugal have put authority over crimes
committed by military personnel back in the hands of civilian courts to some
degree. See Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82
YALE L.J. 1398, 1398 & n.4 (1973); Daniela Cotelea et al., The Role of Military
Courts Across Europe: A Comparative Understanding of Military Justice Systems,
FINABEL 13 (2021), https://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/20.-The-roleof-Military-Courts-across-Europ.pdf; Mindia Vashakmadze, Understanding
Military Justice, GENEVA CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL ARMED FORCES 12–14
(2010), https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Milit.Just
ice_Guidebook_ENG.pdf; The Netherlands, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/the_netherlands_december_2016.
pdf (Nov. 3, 2016); see, e.g., Austria Military Justice, PHOSTIUS, https://photius
.com/countries/austria/national_security/austria_national_security_military_jus
tice.html (last visited May 28, 2022) (“Sections 533 to 684 of Austria’s national
criminal code deal with military offenses; there is no separate military code of
justice and there is no legal (judge advocate) organization in the armed forces.
All actions in serious criminal cases involving military personnel, except those
related to breaches of military discipline, are remanded to civil courts.”). Canada
has also made the decision to remove investigatory and prosecutorial authority
of sexual misconduct cases to the civil police and courts. Ian Austen & Jennifer
Steinhauser, Canada Turns Over Military Sexual Assault Cases to Civilian
Courts., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/04/world/
canada/canada-military-sexual-assault.html.
210. See Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L.
REV. 3, 4–5 (1970) [hereinafter Sherman, Civilianization of Military Law];
Paradis, supra note 187; James Joyner & James W. Weirick, Sexual Assault in
the Military and the Unlawful Command Influence Catch-22, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(Oct. 7, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/sexual-assault-in-the-militaryand-the-unlawful-command-influence-catch-22/; Charles Dunlap, Civilianizing
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such ideas. 211 Critics may argue that smaller, internal
structural changes might be more useful such as increased
training or greater victim support. However, both of these
have already been suggested and implemented, but with no
significant success. 212 The problem is not due to a lack of
Military Justice? Sorry, It Can’t—and Shouldn’t—Work, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Oct.
8, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/civilianizing-military-justice-sorryit-cant-and-shouldnt-work/; Kirsten Gillibrand, Why Taking Sexual Assault
Cases Out of the Chain of Command Protects Our Troops, DEF. ONE (Nov. 10,
2013),
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/11/why-taking-sexual-assaultcases-out-chain-command-protects-troops/73559/ (discussing the different
associations, veterans groups, and survivors who support the removal of the
chain of command out of the decision-making process, even quoting one survivor
as saying “Having someone within your direct chain of command doesn’t make
any sense, it’s like getting raped by your brother and having your dad decide the
case”).
211. David A. Schlueter & Lisa M. Schenck, Taking Charge of Court-Martial
Charges: The Important Role of the Commander in the American Military Justice
System, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 529, 531–32 (2020); see also Frederic I. Lederer,
From Rome to the Military Justice Acts of 2016 and Beyond: Continuing
Civilianization of the Military Criminal Legal System, 225 MIL. L. REV. 512, 512
(2017); Dunlap, supra note 210; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Military Chiefs Oppose
Removing Commanders from Sexual Assault Probes, CNN (June 5, 2013, 10:31
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/04/politics/senate-hearing-military-sexualassault; Helene Cooper, Senate Rejects Blocking Military Commanders from
Sexual Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/07/us/politics/military-sexual-assault-legislation.html.
212. Harassment prevention and response training and education programs
are required to be established at all levels of professional military development
from the accession point to the assumption of senior leader grade. DEP’T OF DEF.,
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE: PROGRAM PROCEDURES,
INSTRUCTION 1020.03, at 16 (2018), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Docu
ments/DD/issuances/dodi/102003p.PDF?ver=DAAzonEUeFb8kUWRbT9Epw%3
D%3D. “Commanders, supervisors, and managers at all levels are responsible for
the effective implementation of the SAPR [Sexual Assault Prevention &
Response] Program. Military and DoD civilian officials at each management level
shall advocate a robust SAPR program and provide education and training that
shall enable them to prevent and appropriately respond to incidents of sexual
assault.” 32 C.F.R. § 105.14(a)(1)–(2) (2016) (This was removed on Sept. 17, 2020,
see Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,967 (Sept. 17, 2020), and the revised July 15, 2020 DoD SAPR Program rule
is the only existing rule.). “[A] Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) first
addresses the victim’s immediate safety needs and assigns a SAPR victim
advocate. The SAPR victim advocate provides advocacy and assistance
throughout the medical, investigative, and legal processes, as appropriate.” The
SAPR victim advocates will inform the victim of his/her option to make a
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training or support but lies more so in the military culture
and perceptions and stereotypes that it perpetuates. In 2010,
the Director of the military’s Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Office (SAPRO) stated, “We’re talking about
changing the way people think and the way people feel. . . .
[T]he research tells us it takes eight to ten years to change
the culture.” 213 In the eleven intervening years, little has
changed.
Though lauded as a success, the implementation of the
SHARP Program has been ineffective and has failed at every
level. 214 While on the surface it appeared the SHARP
Program’s framework was sufficient, in reality it was hollow
and
lacking
in
leadership
attention,
day-to-day
implementation, broad acceptance by the enlisted soldiers,
and full inculcation into the culture and character of the
military community. 215 Additionally, workplace hostility and
systemic gender discrimination abound due to differing
physical fitness standards, female inaccessibility to certain
restricted or unrestricted report. Meet Professionals from Each Military Service
Who Are Ready to Help Sexual Assault Survivors, DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT
PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF. (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.sapr.mil/sites/
default/files/public/docs/press/20200922_SAPR_VA_Highlights_FINAL.pdf;
Both the SARC and SAPR victim advocate must undergo extensive training on
the reporting and investigating processes, the medical forensic examination
(SAFE Kit), issues in victimology, healthcare management of sexual assault and
medical resources, etc. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE: PROGRAM PROCEDURES, INSTRUCTION 6495.02, at 107–11 (2013),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/649502_vol1.
PDF.
213. Michael Isikoff, Lawsuit Claims Pentagon Ignored Military Rape Victims,
NBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2011), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/politics/did
_pentagon_turn_blind_eye_to_rape_victims_/1909120/; see also IRC REPORT,
supra note 54, at 11.
214. Cf. CHRIS SWECKER ET AL., U.S. ARMY, REPORT OF THE FORT HOOD
INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE 17 (2020), https://www.army.mil/e2/down
loads/rv7/forthoodreview/2020-12-03_FHIRC_report_redacted.pdf (addressing
the ineffectiveness of the SHARP Program at Fort Hood); Justin-Ryan C. Abueg,
The Influence of the Sexual Harassment and Assault Response and Prevention
Program on Norms and Society in the United States Army (2016) (B.A. honors
thesis, Boston University), https://open.bu.edu/handle/2144/16115.
215. SWECKER ET AL., supra note 214, at 17–19.
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jobs, and leadership favoritism over one gender. 216 Not to
mention the gendered “perception[s] that female service
members manipulate male service members and/or military
systems to get ahead or avoid deployment.” 217 In the current
military culture, increased training and greater victim
support will not be enough to sufficiently resolve the
military’s sexual violence crisis.
As a result of global precedent and past and present
military failures, the “civilianization” of the military judicial
system seems the most effective way to provide military
victims with greater justice. 218 The significant problems with
institutional self-regulation and self-preservation make it
nearly impossible to effectively implement change and still
allow the military to maintain its expansive judicial control.
Though removal of authority out of the chain of command is
a step in the right direction it does not go far enough. Current
military systems which parallel the 2022 NDAA provisions
illustrate its ineffectiveness at transforming the military’s
approach to sexual violence, because it fails to alter the
deeply ingrained military culture. Until the military changes
this culture plagued by gender discrimination, false
perceptions, and stereotypes, the only way to effectuate
reform is to release the military’s grasp over the entire
judicial process.
CONCLUSION
Vanessa Guillén’s death reignited the debate over the
military’s sexual violence crisis. Though the Act created in
her honor has yet to be voted on, change has occurred but on

216. Meghann Myers, A Culture That Fosters Sexual Assaults and Sexual
Harassment Persists Despite Prevention Efforts, a New Pentagon Study Shows,
MIL. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/
2020/04/30/a-culture-that-fosters-sexual-assaults-and-sexual-harassment-persis
ts-despite-prevention-efforts-a-new-pentagon-study-shows/.
217. Id.
218. Sherman, Civilianization of Military Law, supra note 210, at 103.
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a smaller scale. The 2022 NDAA provisions utilized a
successful method to bring about reform, particularly in the
divided and politically polarized world of today. However, the
2022 NDAA failed to capitalize on its success. The military’s
culture breeds resentment and systemic gender
discrimination. Such a culture is ill-equipped to effectuate
any substantive change. As this Comment has outlined, until
the military culture itself is disassembled, rebuilt, and
remodeled, the only path towards reform is severing the
military’s hold over the judicial process.
The military’s track record has left much to be desired
regarding its approach to sexual violence. Its failure to make
any meaningful change over the last thirty years, despite
tragedy after tragedy and scandal after scandal, highlights
the need for a new judicial framework. Removing this core
function of the military’s judicial construct will assist in
eliminating the significant impact of both institutional and
individual implicit bias. Ideally, neutral decisionmakers who
have not dedicated their entire lives to the military will be in
a better place to protect the individual over the institution.
This solution will not fix the problem overnight. But
realigning the institution’s fundamental objective to protect
and support all victims of sexual violence will begin the long
process of rebuilding confidence and faith in the military’s
judicial system.

